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Abstract
The dissertation contains three papers on European merger control. The first two
empirical papers discuss the estimation of deterrence effects in the merger con-
trol policy of the European Union, whereas the third theoretical paper examines





Die Dissertation beinhaltet drei Arbeiten zur europäischen Zusammenschlusskon-
tolle. Die ersten zwei empirischen Arbeiten befassen sich mit der Schätzung
von Abschreckungseffekten der Zusammenschlusskontrollpolitik der Europäischen
Union, und die dritte theoretische Arbeit untersucht die strategische Interaktion
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1 Introduction
Merger control became an instrument of competition policy in Germany and the
European Union (EU) only fairly recently. While merger control in the U.S. had
been introduced already in the early 20th century, Germany established a merger
control in the 1970s, while the EU Merger Regulation was implemented 15 years
later. In both jurisdictions, competition laws of a general nature preceded the
introduction of merger control, meaning that mergers would sometimes fall into
the scope of individual provisions without the laws setting forth an explicit ex
ante review of mergers.
The core problem of the initial competition laws in Germany and the EU was
that their wording was limited to already existing restrictions to competitions
like cartels and at the abuse of a dominant position, but did not extend to the
possibility that market dominance could be reached by concentration or acquisi-
tion of companies.1 Thus, slowly but inevitably, a formal merger review became
a necessity in Germany and the EU. Today, the ex ante control of mergers forms
an indispensable part of competition policy and is regulated specifically.
Compared to other fields of law, it is a typical feature of competition law in-
cluding merger control that it needs to adjust to industrial and technological
developments more quickly and effectively, since it is the law applicable to con-
stantly changing and transforming environments, i.e., industries and technologies.
The legal history of German and EU competition laws shows that they had to
undergo substantial revisions over time. Competition policy can be seen as the
1 The European Court of Justice, after the Continental Can case, approved the ex post use
of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome to prevent mergers.
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byproduct of political thinking and economic frameworks in a jurisdiction, ren-
dering flexibility in its instruments and sanctions imperative. Each jurisdiction
might have slightly different goals for employing competition policy, be it to at-
tain economic efficiency, to maintain a common market without discrimination
or to safeguard competition as such or to advance social objectives – these goals
might change over time,2 but in order to realise the goals, an effective policy is
of importance.
There are different ways to examine the effectiveness of a legal institution: The
analysis can focus on the letters of the law or its enforcement. It can hence ex-
amine the rules’ scope of applicability or possible Type I and Type II errors of an
authority’s decision, its deterrence effects, or the procedural efficiency. The rea-
son for testing the effectiveness is that an effective regulation is able to influence
the future behaviour of its addressees into the desired direction in a more accu-
rate and targeted manner, since the authority cannot police each individual case
without committing inefficiently many resources in the first place and since the
law cannot explicitly mention each conceivable case either in its provisions. The
authority and the law it enforces should therefore send the right signals to firms,
by taking the right decisions, conducting the right procedural steps and appealing
to the right addressees. Ultimately and ideally, self-correction should be reached,
holding violations within natural reigns without too much state intervention.
My dissertation is dedicated to analysing the effectiveness of EU merger control.
After more than 20 years of merger control practice and more than 5000 notified
mergers, there is case law and data available to reevaluate the existing rules and
enforcement practice. While qualitative analyses have been already made in the
past, such as explorative interviews or surveys based on which amendments to
2 In Germany, for example, economic recession in the late 19th century allowed firms to form
cartels to protect themselves against brutal capitalism, cut-throat competition and price
warfare. While competition policy thus first had the objective to protect economic freedom
and freedom of contracting, it slowly, by recognising the abusive potential of cartels, shifted
to the neoliberal idea of a regulator guaranteeing the institutional framework for a free-
market economy after the Second World War (Ordnungspolitik) which laid the basis for
modern day competition policy in Germany.
2
the law have been made, the quantitative analysis of the data is lagging behind.
Chapters 2 and 3 will focus on the deterrence of merger decisions. The deter-
rence concept has been widely applied to criminal law. The main idea is that the
right severity of punishment can deter potential criminals to commit the crime.
The concept can to some extent be applied to merger control.3 In a jurisdic-
tion such as the EU, where merger control serves to maximize welfare, what the
merging firms need to be deterred from is to file for mergers which are welfare-
decreasing without discouraging them from notifying welfare-increasing mergers.
The European Commission, by choosing the right decision or the right kind of
remedies, can send meaningful signals to the outside world. Chapter 2 will first
examine if there are deterrent effects on an industry level, while Chapter 3 will
break the analysis down to the level of the merging firms. The central question
of both analyses will be how well the different kinds of merger control decisions
work to influence the subsequent merging behaviour of firms. An additional ques-
tion is whether there are any differences in the effectiveness between Phase 1 and
Phase 2 instruments. Phase 2 instruments take up more financial and personnel
resources than Phase 1 instruments, and, while it might be good news if Phase 2
instruments worked well from a deterrence perspective, at the same time, it will
be important to heighten the accuracy of Phase 1 instruments. In the long run,
this will send the appropriate signals to the outside world to file less problematic
mergers and a smaller selection of cases will in general end up in Phase 2. For
the purpose of my analysis, Chapter 2 will distinguish between industries of low-
and high-competition intensity and whether or not the Merger Control Reform
in 2004 entailed a change in deterrent effects. Chapter 3 will, instead of working
with high and low competition industries, identify each merger as anticompetitive
or not and analyse their development over years in view of the decisions taken by
the European Commission.
3 As will be argued later in the relevant chapter, deterrence in merger control feeds to some
extent on the commitment of errors by the authority. Therefore, both concepts, i.e., deter-




Chapter 4 will focus on the procedural effectiveness of merger control, more
precisely, whether or not the current involvement of competitors is efficiency-
increasing. The main objective of the analysis will be to scrutinise the extent to
which competitors can potentially abuse or strategically manipulate the decision
by submitting misleading or false information. Depending on the result of the
analysis, the involvement of competitors could then lead to a conflict between
legal due process considerations and economic efficiency. An effective rule would
avoid such conflict and align the interests of lawyers and economists in such way
that both goals would be served without leaving any room to abusing the rule.
4
2 Deterrence in EU Merger
Policy
This chapter is based on Clougherty et al. [2013b].
2.1 Introduction
The design and enforcement of competition rules is one of the cornerstones of
European Union (EU) policy to support the European integration process and
stimulate sustainable growth. In fact, the founding Treaty of Rome deemed that
Member States would cede authority over competition issues to the European in-
stitutions, since this was considered to be essential for a well functioning internal
market. Thus to support these objectives, the European Commission (Commis-
sion) has been granted enhanced powers of enforcement in this field [Neven, 2006].
The received wisdom among economists and policymakers is that competition
matters when it comes to economic efficiency and innovation incentives [Nick-
ell, 1996, Aghion et al., 2005]. Moreover, these benefits are even more relevant
during times of economic crisis [Cole and Ohanian, 2004]. Effective competition,
therefore, plays a fundamental role in promoting the welfare of an economy when
markets cannot rely on substantial amounts of capital to stimulate economic
growth. Furthermore, by producing consumer savings through lower prices and
higher-quality products, competition can stimulate demand, lower inflation, and
lead to concrete improvements in the purchasing power of consumers. Finally,
5
2 Deterrence in EU Merger Policy
competition also reduces price levels in the wholesale and intermediary markets
– markets that are fundamental to the greater economy.
While there is wide consensus that competition is welfare-enhancing during
both prosperous and difficult economic periods, it is a bit more controversial to
state that competition policy actually does a good job of effectively stimulating
competition. In light of this uncertainty, a number of scholars have called for more
research on whether and how actual competition is influenced by competition
authorities [e.g., Crandall and Winston, 2003, Baker, 2003, Buccirossi et al., 2013].
Among the different areas of competition enforcement, we focus on merger pol-
icy in this study. Merger control plays a crucial role in competition policy because
it is the only instrument via which authorities can engage in ex ante prevention
of anticompetitive situations. Given that it is much harder to intervene ex post,
competition law enforcement has not been extremely successful at stopping pre-
existing firms from abusing any dominance they hold in a market or at hindering
the occurrence of collusion [Kovacic, 2009]. Consequently, an effective merger
policy is a pivotal component of a well functioning competition policy.
Despite the significance of merger policy, recent studies indicate that the Com-
mission’s enforcement of merger policy is far from perfect.1 The EU courts
have likewise agreed that a number of errors have been made in the conduct of
merger policy. Namely, four prohibition decisions (Airtours/First Choice, Schnei-
der/Legrand, Tetra Laval/Sidel, and GE/Honeywell) from the early 2000s were
appealed by the merging parties, and in all four cases the EU courts identified
problems with regard to the rigor of the Commission’s economic analysis. The
public attention engendered by these cases – and other related issues – led to a
substantial modernization of the EU merger control institutions. In particular,
Council Regulation 139 in 2004 aimed to reform the Commission’s competition
1 In a sample of 168 transactions over the 1990–2002 period, Duso et al. [2007] find that
about one-quarter of the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) approved by the Commission
were actually anticompetitive in nature. Using the same data, Duso et al. [2011] found that
remedial actions – the most commonly employed merger intervention tool – only partially
help in restoring effective competition.
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policy in order to achieve a ‘more economic approach’ in the implementation of
EU competition laws. In practice, this meant a case-by-case approach guided by
economic principles instead of the application of per se legal rules.
While the policy debate and academic studies on the effectiveness of EU merger
policy are often based on rulings regarding already proposed mergers (e.g., the
presence of Type I and Type II errors in merger control), merger policy actu-
ally entails more than just direct effects from the detection, amelioration, and
prohibition of anticompetitive merger activity. In particular, substantial indirect
effects also possibly exist. Indeed, as many commentators agree [e.g., Nelson and
Sun, 2002, Davies and Majumdar, 2002], direct effects might only represent the
tip of the iceberg when it comes to the overall impact of merger control. Namely,
indirect deterrence effects have been considered to be quite important, as firms
are likely to internalise competition rules in their decision-making and thus alter
the types and frequencies of the mergers they propose due to the presence – and
changes in the tenor of – merger policy [Eckbo, 1992, Crandall and Winston,
2003]. Hence, an effective merger policy should create incentives that shape the
behaviour of firms in violation of these rules, since no policy can be truly effective
if its every application has to be policed [Baker, 2003]. Thus, the effects of merger
policy are not limited to the specific firms targeted by merger control actions, but
should surely also include all firms whose behaviour and performance might be
affected – i.e., deterred – in the future by specific decisions and specific policies
[Sørgard, 2009, Salop, 2013a]. In this vein, Joskow [2002, 99–100] notes that ‘the
test of a good legal rule is not primarily whether it leads to the correct decision in
a particular case, but rather whether it does a good job deterring anticompetitive
behavior.’
The principal aim of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the deterrence effects
involved with EU merger policy over the past two decades. For that purpose, we
have gathered information regarding all mergers notified to the Commission from
1990 until 2009 – over 4,200 mergers – and regarding the type and frequency of the
7
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various merger policy actions taken by the Commission: i.e., clearances, remedies,
and prohibitions. We are able to distinguish whether these merger policy actions
took place in Phase 1 or Phase 2 of the Commission’s merger review process.
The ability to differentiate between different types of merger policy actions and
the different timings is helpful, as these differences may involve different costs for
firms and, therefore, generate distinct deterrence effects [Seldeslachts et al., 2009,
Salop, 2013a]. The high level of detail involved with the Commission’s merger
reports suggests that our constructed database represents the best available data
upon which to assess the deterrence effects involved with merger policy.2
We will study then the impact of the Commission’s merger policy actions on the
proclivity of firms to engage in future merger activity at the industry level. We
concentrate specifically on the ability of different merger policy tools to generate
forsaken merger activity; i.e., deals not proposed by potential merging parties.
We will also consider how deterrence has evolved over time; in particular, whether
the 2004 reforms in EU merger control resulted in substantial changes in terms
of deterrence. We will further investigate whether EU merger policy involves
more deterrence in low-competition industries – low competition as measured by
both the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (akin to the Commission’s initial
screening) and the elasticity of firms’ profit with respect to costs [Boone, 2008].
Our working assumption is that effective deterrence would involve merger policy
actions in low-competition industries generating more robust deterrence effects
as compared to high-competition industries, as mergers in low-competition in-
dustries would tend to be more anticompetitive.
The immediate tangible benefits of our study are threefold. First, we begin the
process of factoring the deterrence effects of EU merger policy; thus, we begin the
2 While recent empirical scholarship exists concerning merger policy deterrence, these studies
tend to be broad and cross-jurisdictional in nature [e.g., Seldeslachts et al., 2009] or focused
on U.S. merger control [e.g., Clougherty and Seldeslachts, 2013]. Furthermore, the data
employed in those studies tends to be somewhat patchy due to the reluctance of most




quantification of what has until now been unquantified in the European context
in a comprehensive manner. Second, we are able to examine which particular
merger policy instruments – and at what stage of the merger review process –
tend to indicate substantial deterrence, and whether deterrence works better in
those industries where it is potentially most necessary. As Crandall and Winston
[2003, p. 4] argue, scholarship must ‘explain why some enforcement actions [. . . ]
are helpful and others are not.’ Third, by covering such a large timespan of
EU merger control, we can investigate whether EU institutional merger reforms
yielded any substantial improvement in the ability of merger policy to generate
deterrence effects. In particular, we will be able to factor whether the 2004
reforms brought about enhanced deterrence effects.
Our empirical results indicate that only remedies applied during the initial
investigation phase (Phase 1 Remedies) yield robust deterrence. Finding that
Phase 1 Remedies – but not Phase 2 Remedies – involve deterrence may be ex-
plained by the fact that the Commission could have more bargaining power in the
early stages of the merger review process. Accordingly, the Commission is able
to extract greater concessions from firms in Phase 1, which lead then to more
substantial remedies and, in turn, greater deterrence effects. Furthermore, the
results also show that Phase 1 Remedies after the 2004 policy reform indicate
relatively large deterrence. However, these post-2004 deterrence effects are not
significantly different from pre-2004 periods. This may be because of two coun-
tervailing effects. The 2004 reforms made EU merger policy more efficient and
transparent in some respects. On the other hand, its more economics-grounded
case-by-case approach may have offset these gains in other aspects. Given that
deterrence generally improves with certainty [Craswell and Calfee, 1986], the net
effect of the reforms may have been close to zero. Finally, we find that Phase 1
Remedies involve greater deterrence in low-competition industries (measured by
the HHI) than in high-competition industries – a finding which is consistent with
EU merger policy mostly deterring anticompetitive mergers.
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The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes our deterrence framework. Sections 3 and 4 respectively explain the data
and estimation strategy. Section 5 discusses the results, while Section 6 concludes
and provides some policy insights.
2.2 A Deterrence Framework
We measure the deterrence effects of EU merger policy by employing the method-
ology from the economics of crime literature spawned by Becker [1968]. In this
framework, enforcement actions make criminals update their probabilities of be-
ing caught and update their estimations of the punishments involved with being
caught.3 The proposal of an anticompetitive merger is, of course, no crime in the
strict sense, but the deterrence mechanism is analogous in this environment as un-
desirable actions are punished. Accordingly, the methodological framework from
the economics of crime literature provides a sound means for a specific analysis of
the deterrence effects involved with different EU merger policy instruments. In-
deed, we know that effective deterrence requires those tempted by anticompetitive
actions to believe that transgressing those rules involves a reasonable probability
of being caught and suffering consequences [Craswell and Calfee, 1986, Baker,
2003].
As outlined in the theoretical framework of Seldeslachts et al. [2009], changes in
merger policy actions represent manifestations of actual merger policy changes.
Hence, firms update their beliefs regarding the competition authority’s stance
when they witness upticks and downticks in policy actions. For example, in-
creases in a particular merger policy action lead then to positive updating of the
probability of eliciting such an action in the future. Sah [1991] shows that the
3 The economics of crime literature rests on strong theoretical foundations [Becker, 1968], has
been subject to a great deal of scholarship [see Cameron, 1994, Grogger, 1990, Cloninger and
Marchesini, 2006, for reviews], and has elicited a healthy dose of criticism [e.g., Garoupa,
1997, Berk, 2005, Donohue and Wolfers, 2005]. Thus, this is a widely employed and well
tested methodology.
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above properties are indeed satisfied when perceptions are described by Bayesian
inference.
With the above in mind, we can generate our empirical setup where we consider
the impact of changes in merger policy actions on future levels of notified merger
activity. Our framework is based on the idea that if deterrence is at play, then a
positive change in merger policy actions should signal to future merging parties
that the expected cost of proposing an anticompetitive merger has increased. In
response to such changes, a proportion of the planned anticompetitive merger
activity will be forsaken by merging parties. Accordingly, there should be a
negative relationship between merger policy actions and levels of proposed merger
activity in subsequent years. On the other hand, if there is no deterrence at play
(e.g., if a particular merger policy instrument is not perceived by merging parties
to be costly), then we should see no relationship between merger policy actions
and levels of proposed merger activity in subsequent years. As an aside, we must,
of course, control for potential confounding factors; hence, we will explain how
we capture the merger wave in the next section, as this is an essential element
in our empirical strategy to isolate deterrence effects. In essence, we empirically
capture deterrence (i.e., forsaken merger activity) as the departure in merger
activity levels from those levels that would otherwise be predicted by the merger
wave.
While our main analysis considers whether the enforcement of merger control
leads to forsaken merger activity in subsequent periods, we do not differentiate
between competitive and anticompetitive mergers per se. It would be difficult
to identify the precise level of anticompetitiveness for each particular merger
proposal in a deterrence study with the scope of ours.4 Yet, using changes in the
number of notified mergers in order to elicit deterrence does raise the issue as to
4 One could in principle use stock market data for both merging and rival firms – e.g., Duso
et al. [2007, 2011] – in order to assess the competitive impact of a particular merger. How-
ever, this methodology is unfeasible in our context due to the scale of our study: where we
desire to elicit the deterrence effects of different merger policy tools at the industry-sector
level over a two-decade period.
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which types of mergers tend to be actually forsaken by merging parties. Some
scholars have expressed the specific concern that procompetitive mergers are often
deterred [e.g., Eckbo, 1989, 1992]. It seems, however, more probable that altering
the tenor of merger policy would have a greater impact on anticompetitive merger
activity. For example, the Deloitte and Touche [2007] study for the UK Office of
Fair Trading provides evidence via surveys that UK merger policy rarely deters
procompetitive merger activity. More recently, Baarsma et al. [2012] completed
a similar survey for the Dutch competition authorities and confirmed this point
regarding the rarity of procompetitive mergers being deterred.
Clougherty and Seldeslachts [2013] considered similar issues when they exam-
ined changes in the composition (horizontals versus non-horizontals) of proposed
merger activity in order to proxy for the competitive nature of U.S. merger noti-
fications. Such an empirical strategy is enabled by the fact that U.S. authorities
provide information on the number of horizontal and non-horizontal merger pro-
posals (whereas the Commission does not). This empirical strategy is based
on Stigler’s [1966] factoring changes in the general composition of U.S. merger
activity in the years following the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act. Fol-
lowing Stigler’s seminal work, and given the fact that U.S. antitrust authorities
almost exclusively target horizontal merger activity as potentially anticompet-
itive, Clougherty and Seldeslachts [2013] question whether U.S. merger policy
actions in targeted sectors lead both to reduced horizontal merger notifications
and to unaffected non-horizontal merger notifications in those particular sectors.
Such a result would be consistent with U.S. merger control mainly deterring anti-
competitive mergers, as anticompetitive mergers are strictly a subset of horizontal
merger activity in the U.S. context. That study did indeed find that changes in
U.S. merger policy actions lead to decreased horizontal merger activity – and
unaffected non-horizontal merger activity – in subsequent years.
Summarizing the above, preexisting empirical scholarship (e.g., surveys of Eu-
ropean legal advisors and CEOs and evidence from U.S. merger policy) indicates
12
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that anticompetitive mergers are principally affected by changes in the tenor of
merger control. Nevertheless, we will be able to extend our basic framework
in order to allow differentiation between high-competition and low-competition
industries. Specifically, we will define high-competition versus low-competition
industries on the basis of two indicators. First, we construct a traditional mea-
sure of industry concentration that is frequently employed in merger cases – the
HHI. Second, we apply an alternative measure of competition intensity: namely,
the relative-profits measure recently developed by Boone [2008] and empirically
operationalised by Griffith et al. [2005]. This measure quantifies the elasticity of a
firm’s profits with respect to its average cost level – where higher elasticities (i.e.,
firm profits that are more responsive to costs) indicate more intense competition.
These indicators will be explained in more detail below in the data section.
The prior that mergers occurring in low-competition industries are more likely
to be anticompetitive resides behind these additional tests. For example, all else
equal, a merger that reduces the number of industry competitors from three to
two is likely to be more anticompetitive than a merger that reduces the number
of industry competitors from ten to nine – a logic similar to that employed by
the Commission in its initial merger screening process. Indeed, the Commission
routinely clears mergers in competitive industries based on the HHI and market
shares for the involved firms; though, it takes a closer look at the mergers notified
in low-competition industries.5
Accordingly, if deterrence is to work effectively, then merger policy actions in
low-competition industries should generate larger deterrence effects than would
merger policy actions in high-competition industries. Moreover, it would seem
likely that the Commission would want its merger policy actions to involve a
larger effect in terms of deterrence in low-competition industries.
5 In its guidelines concerning the assessment of horizontal merger activity [Commission, 2004,
p. 6], the Commission states that ‘The overall concentration level in a market may also pro-
vide useful information about the competitive situation. In order to measure concentration
levels, the Commission often applies the HHI. [. . . ] The absolute level of the HHI can give
an initial indication of the competitive pressure in the market post-merger.’
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2.3 Data
The data employed in this study are panel in nature (where each industry sector
represents a panel with observations over the 1990–2009 period) and consist of
matching data from two separate sources. First, the Commission’s webpage yields
data on the number of notified mergers per year and industry, and on the corre-
sponding frequency of merger policy actions at the sector-year level of analysis.
Second, Thomson Reuters Worldscope database allows generating the necessary
merger wave controls at the corresponding level.
2.3.1 Merger and Merger Control Data
The principal source of information derives from the publicly accessible cases pub-
lished by the Directorate-General Competition (DG Comp) of the Commission
on its competition webpage.6 The entire history of European merger control –
from its inception with the 1990 EU merger regulation – is represented in these
case files. To better understand the nature of this rich information, it is perhaps
useful to briefly summarise the process of EU merger control.
Mergers that affect European markets must be notified to the Commission when
the deal involves an EU community-wide dimension.7 As pictured in Figure 2.1,
after receiving notification of the merger, the Commission has 25 working days in
which to make an initial assessment of the merger – the so-called Phase 1 Investi-
gation. This phase can be extended to 35 working days when the notifying party
submits potential remedies or if the Member States request (or are requested to)
referral of the case. Following this preliminary investigation, the Commission
6 Statistics on the notified mergers as well as reports for each of the Commission’s decisions can
be downloaded from the Commission’s webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/
cases/.
7 A merger has an EU community dimension if ‘(i) It takes place between firms with a combined
worldwide turnover of at least 5 billion Euros and, (ii) a turnover within the European
Economic Area of more than 250 million Euros for each of at least two of the participating
firms (unless each merging firm achieves more than 2/3 of its aggregate community turnover
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can unconditionally clear the proposed merger if it does not significantly impede
effective competition (Phase 1 Clearance). Alternatively, the Commission can
decide to accept remedies proposed by the merging parties in this first bargain-
ing stage (Phase 1 Remedy). This occurs when the proposed commitments –
e.g., selling some problematic assets to a competitor – would effectively attenu-
ate the anticompetitive issues that are identified by the Commission. However,
the Commission can also conclude that the proposed concentration raises serious
competitive issues that are not solved by the proposed remedies. If this is the
case, the Commission will then initiate a more in-depth analysis (Phase 2 Investi-
gation). Finally, merging parties will sometimes withdraw their proposed merger
during the initial investigation phase (Phase 1 Withdrawal).
Phase 2 Investigations can go for a maximum of 90 working days.8 After
this more detailed investigation, the Commission can again unconditionally clear
the merger (Phase 2 Clearance), clear the merger conditional on commitments
(Phase 2 Remedy), or prohibit the concentration (Phase 2 Prohibition). The
merging parties may also decide to withdraw the merger in Phase 2 (Phase 2
Withdrawals). Commentators [e.g., Bergman et al., 2005] have argued that when
8 The investigation can be extended to a maximum of 105 working days if the parties submit
remedies later than 55 days after the start of Phase 2. Moreover, the Commission and the
notifying parties can stop the clock for a maximum of 20 days subject to certain conditions:
e.g., if the merging parties do not comply with requests for relevant information.
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the merging parties withdraw a merger in Phase 2, this can be interpreted as a
virtual prohibition. Indeed, merging parties will oftentimes formally withdraw the
merger before the actual prohibition of the transaction is commuted. Given that
both Phase 2 Prohibitions and Phase 2 Withdrawals suggest a failure to find a
satisfactory remedy that alleviates anticompetitive concerns, we aggregate Phase
2 Prohibitions and Phase 2 Withdrawals into Phase 2 Preventions. Nevertheless,
unreported analysis yields empirical results that are qualitatively identical if we
keep both policy instruments separate.
We analyse the first two decades of EU merger control (1990–2009) where a
total of 4,284 mergers have been notified to the Commission. For each of these
merger cases, we have information on the name of the merging parties involved,
the merger notification date, the type and date of the Commission’s decision(s),
and the main industry affected by the merger as identified by the Commission.
These industries are identified with NACE codes: a classification scheme used
by the EU to categorise economic activities.9 We have annual data covering the
years 1990–2009 for 88 NACE industry groups (m); hence, our unit of analysis
is a particular industry in a particular year (t). For each of these industry-year
combinations, we construct industry-level measures of merger activity and merger
policy actions for the Commission. The first six rows of Table 2.1 report the exact
definition of these different merger policy variables, where merger clearances serve
as the benchmark and are not explicitly included in the analysis.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the total number of mergers notified by year across all
industries. The figure shows that merger behaviour follows a characteristic wave-
like pattern. During the 1990s, the number of merger proposals steadily increased.
Yet following the burst in the dotcom bubble, we see a reversal in this trend
9 While NACE industries can be as detailed as for example ‘C10.7.3 – Manufacture of mac-
aroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products’, we have chosen a higher level
of aggregation. For example, the above mentioned industry is aggregated (together with
17 others) into the group ‘C10 – Manufacture of food products’. This is done to measure
deterrence at a relatively broad level and has the additional advantage that it reduces the
number of zero-observations for an industry-year combination.
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Table 2.1: Definition of the Variables
Variable Definition
Nmt # of mergers notified to the Commission in industry m in year t
R1mt # of mergers cleared with remedies in Phase 1 in industry m in year t
W 1mt # of mergers withdrawn by the merging firms after Phase 1 in industry m in year t
R2mt # of mergers cleared with remedies in Phase 2 in industry m in year t
P 2mt # of preventions (sum of prohibitions and withdrawals) in Phase 2 in industry m in
year t
Amt # of merger policy actions: R1mt + W 1mt + R2mt + P 2mt
Salesgrowthmt Mean of sales growth over a 2-years period for all firms i present in industry m in
year t [as defined in Andrade and Stafford, 2004]:
(salesimt − salesimt−2)/salesimt−2
Sharereturnmt Mean of annual return on shares for firms i in industry m in year t:
(market valueimt − market valueimt−1)/market valueimt−1
Tobinsqmt Mean Tobin’s q for firms i in industry m in year t:




market value equityimt = common stock outstandingimt
× average closing priceimt
HHImt Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in industry m in year t based on the sales for all firms i







Betamt As in Griffith et al. [2005], this measure of competitiveness is captured by the time-
industry-specific coefficients, Betamt, which are the time-industry-specific coefficient
estimates from an OLS regression of variable profits on average costs for all firms i
within industry m in year t:




Variable profits are defined as πimt ≈ salesimt − cost of goods soldimt, whereas av-







cost of goods soldimt
salesimt
= AVCimt.
Notes: We describe the main variables of interest of this study. While Worldscope variables are reported
in the local currencies of the respective home country, we converted everything into US$ for consistency
purposes. Furthermore, all variables are price adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index of the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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through the 2000–2003 period. Merger activity levels rose again after 2004 and
reached a peak in 2007; however, the number of merger proposals indicates a
significant downward trend with the financial crisis of 2008–2009.
Similarly, Figure 2.3 displays the total number of yearly merger policy actions
taken by the Commission. The activity levels for merger policy appear to corre-
late to some extent with the levels of merger activity. Some additional factors,
however, are seemingly at play in the observed patterns. After the reversal of four
prohibitions by the European courts in the early 2000s (Airtours/First Choice,
Schneider/Legrand, Tetra Laval/Sidel, and GE/Honeywell), both the number of
Phase 2 Preventions and the number of Phase 2 Remedies decrease. Additionally,
both Phase 1 Remedies and Phase 1 Withdrawals occur more frequently over the
same period. Accordingly, there appears to be some indications here of a trend
whereby Commission officials are more actively using Phase 1 of the merger re-
view process to settle merger cases. This potentially shows an improvement in
reaching an early agreement, suggesting an increasing efficiency of communica-
tions between merging firms and the Commission. As noted by Lyons [2009,
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p. 166], ‘Reasons for this include experience, more written guidance, a more eco-
nomic approach, and the impact of the Courts.’ Alternatively, there may be a
realisation by the Commission that they have more bargaining power in Phase 1,
as will be later explained in more detail.
An initial consideration of our industry-based dataset indicates that many in-
dustries exhibit a dearth of merger policy actions. In other words, quite a few
industries show a complete lack of activity in terms of merger policy. These in-
dustries will not help in identifying the deterrence effects involved with active
merger policy enforcement, as deterrence in our framework functions via firms
updating their beliefs about the Commission’s stance through actual changes in
merger policy actions. Therefore, we will exclude these inactive industries from
our analysis.10
10 In particular, we drop those industries where we observe 2 or less merger policy actions
over the whole period of our sample (1990–2009). A simple logit procedure shows that the
likelihood of being an inactive industry significantly increases with the HHI; i.e., industries
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2.3.2 Control Variables
Industry-level economic and financial conditions have been widely recognised as
important drivers of merger behaviour Harford [e.g., 2005]; thus, we must con-
struct industry-level variables that control for the tendencies in merger activity
levels. To do so, we use information on European firms from Thomson World-
scope databases over the 1990–2009 period. Doing so ensures that our firm-level
data matches the European markets affected by the merger activity observed in
our sample.11 We aggregate this firm-level balance sheet and income-statement
information at the industry-year level (m, t) and match these data with our rele-
vant merger activity and merger policy constructs.12 After this matching process,
we are left with 72 industries spanning the 1990 to 2009 period.
with higher concentrations are more likely to be inactive in terms of merger policy. One
might tentatively deduce that in highly concentrated industries firms do not propose a
merger because they know that this merger will simply not be approved. While it is, of
course, unclear whether this holds for all of our inactive industries, it is consistent with
the fact that the mere existence of credible merger policy institutions could by itself have
a deterrence effect in concentrated industries – a point that policymakers often make. For
example, Coate [2005] states that a merger to monopoly is essentially never proposed and
mergers of 2-to-3 and 3-to-4 have very little chance of not being challenged in the U.S.
Baker [2003, p. 38] further indirectly supports such indirect deterrence when he presents a
historical perspective of U.S. merger policy, and concludes that ‘studies of firm behaviour
[. . . ] demonstrate that without antitrust, firms can and do exercise market power, to the
detriment of consumers and other buyers.’ Aaronson [1992] provides some examples of UK
industries where a sort of shutdown in both merger and merger policy activity has taken
place over a period of time – these are industries where competition authorities have signalled
that horizontal M&As are simply unwelcome in the foreseeable future.
11 We use data from firms broadly defined to include all countries of the European Economic
Area, plus Turkey. In particular, we include firms located in the following countries: Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Channel Islands, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom.
12 The primary industries of activity for firms in Worldscope are identified through the U.S. SIC
codes, while the industry merger activity is categorised according to the EU NACE codes.
We, therefore, match these different industries by using the U.S. census bureau table of
conversion (http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html). To
avoid double counting, we employ a 1 to 1 matching procedure. However, this conversion
table sometimes allocates the same SIC industry into different NACE industries. Hence,
as a robustness check, we also define the industries via an alternative m to 1 matching
procedure and show in Appendix A, that qualitative results do not change when using this
allocation process. This should come as no surprise, since these industry control variables
capture broad changes in industry trends, which are only partially affected by the possible
misallocation of some firms.
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We follow Andrade et al. [2001], Harford [2005], and Clougherty and Seldeslachts
[2013] by constructing a set of variables which have been found to be impor-
tant drivers of merger waves: the industry median sales growth (Salesgrowthmt),
the industry median return on shares (Sharereturnmt), and the industry median
market-to-book ratio or Tobin’s q (Tobinsqmt). The second part of Table 2.1
reports the precise descriptions of these three control constructs, as well as the
descriptions for the additional control variables described below.
The three industry-level controls represent primary factors influencing merger
activity levels. First, Andrade et al. [2001] find that industries with substantial
sales growth tend to experience greater merger activity levels. Several related ex-
planations exist behind this relationship; yet in essence, once an economic shock
occurs to sales growth in an industry, the collective reaction of firms is such that
industry assets are reallocated via merger activity. Mergers will tend then to
cluster in time, as managers simultaneously react to similar shocks by competing
for the best combinations of assets. Second, industries with higher share prices or
market-to-book ratios often indicate greater merger activity levels. The motiva-
tions behind this relationship come from the so-called misvaluation explanations,
which tend to build on stock market overvaluation. Proponents of this ratio-
nale argue that acquirers with temporary overvalued shares will tend to exchange
these shares for real assets in undervalued targets: where the target shareholders
accept such a proposition due to having shorter time horizons [Harford, 2005,
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003].
Furthermore, in order to account for the competitive conditions in the relevant
industries, we construct a traditional measure of industry concentration: the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHImt). The HHI measure is currently employed
by the Commission as a means to initially screen merger cases [Commission, 2004].
That said, employing the HHI does involve some shortcomings when it comes to
measuring competition, as its theoretical foundations are based on quantity com-
petition and thus often fail to capture the competitive conduct of firms [see, e.g.,
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Buccirossi et al., 2009, for an overview]. In light of these shortcomings, we also
employ a measure of competition that was recently developed by Boone [2008] and
empirically operationalised by Griffith et al. [2005]. This relative-profits measure
quantifies the elasticity of a firm’s profits with respect to its cost level (Betamt).
More negative values for this Beta indicate more intense competition since firm
profits will be more (negatively) related to costs. Boone et al. [2007] show that
this Beta is a reliable construct representing the development of competition over
time for several models of competition, particularly with oligopolistic markets.
Oligopolistic markets are quite relevant from a competition policy perspective;
hence, this Beta indicator of competition represents an interesting means for our
study to elicit information on the level of competition in an industry.
Table 2.2 reports preliminary statistics for our estimation sample; notice that –
as will be explained below – we lose some two years of data due to our employing
two-year lagged variables as regressors. Merger activity levels average some 5
proposals per year per industry, while merger policy actions occur slightly more
than once every two years (0.57 merger policy actions per year on average). Phase
1 Remedies represent the most common merger policy action, followed by Phase
Table 2.2: Preliminary Statistics Estimation Sample
Mean S.D. Min Max
Merger Proposals 5.176 5.296 0 28
P1 Remedies 0.259 0.569 0 3
P1 Withdrawals 0.143 0.388 0 3
P2 Remedies 0.116 0.379 0 3
P2 Preventions 0.055 0.248 0 2
Merger Policy Actions 0.572 0.956 0 7
HHI 0.132 0.123 0.013 0.751
Beta −2.157 3.246 −27.229 23.743
Salesgrowth (yearly mean) 0.156 0.293 −0.715 1.785
Tobinsq (yearly mean) 4.161 34.727 0.382 853.553




1 Withdrawals, and then by Phase 2 Remedies. In terms of observable industry
characteristics, the average HHI is 0.132, but the variance across industries is
quite large; e.g., 0.751 represents the maximum concentration. A similar pattern
of variation across industries can be observed for the Beta – which measures
intensity of competition as an elasticity of profits with respect to costs.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
2.4.1 Main Analysis
The focused aim of this project is to investigate the deterrence effects involved
with the various EU merger policy instruments. Thus, we study the impact of
different EU merger policy actions on the proclivity of firms to engage in fu-
ture merger activity at the industry level. As observed in the data description,
mergers manifest in wave-like patterns. Accordingly, holding the merger wave
constant represents a crucial feature in empirically eliciting deterrence effects [see
Seldeslachts et al., 2009, Clougherty and Seldeslachts, 2013]. In particular, the
departure in merger activity levels from the merger wave represents deterrence;
i.e., the merger wave represents the fundamental counterfactual via which deter-
rence is captured. In order to ensure that we have a well specified merger wave,
we will control for the wave via a variety of means: year fixed-effects, control
variables from the finance literature on merger waves, and a dynamic panel data
approach.
First, we include year dummy variables in order to capture economy-wide
period-specific shocks which are common across industries and which might trig-
ger macro-level merger waves. In addition, most of our regression specifications
will employ industry-level dummy variables in order to control for time-invariant
industry-specific heterogeneity in merger behaviour.
Second, we also include relevant measures that capture time-varying industry
factors that explain merger activity levels as indicated by the above-mentioned
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scholarship in finance. While much of the research in economics has failed to
consider merger activity in its proper wave-like context, research in finance has
advanced our understanding of merger waves [e.g., Harford, 2005]. In particular,
the finance literature found that both economic and financial factors – such as
market concentration, sales growth, return on shares, and market value – tend to
drive merger activity levels at the industry level. Our methodological approach
builds upon this finance literature, as we take the wave-like nature of merger
activity in our analysis explicitly into account.
Third, we include lagged dependent variables as right-hand-side regressors;
hence, past merger activity levels are deemed to partly explain current merger
activity levels. Two causal forces underlie the role of lagged dependent vari-
ables in our autoregressive specification. For one, industrial organization theory
has identified strategic complementarities between merger decisions, as individ-
ual mergers induce further mergers that would otherwise not occur. Specifically,
subsequent mergers may benefit from higher product-market price increases af-
ter a first merger has occurred; thus, an initial merger may induce additional
mergers [Banal-Estañol et al., 2010]. Second, initial mergers may lead to further
mergers due to rational informational cascades [Banerjee, 1992]. In essence, firms
positively update their beliefs about the profitability of merging when they see
other firms merge. Once enough mergers have occurred, any prior firm-specific
negative views may be cancelled out by the cascade of positive news received from
the market for mergers. Accordingly, firms that would not have merged otherwise
will tend to also merge in this context.
In sum, our methodological approach explicitly takes the wave-like nature of
merger activity into account. By doing so, we can empirically capture deterrence
(i.e., forsaken merger activity), as being the departure in merger activity levels
from those levels that would otherwise be predicted by the merger wave. The
proper setting of the merger wave allows us then to set the pivotal counter-




With the above in mind, our first empirical tests involve investigating whether
merger policy actions as a whole involve deterrence effects. Accordingly, our first
regression specification is the following:
ln Nmt = α0 + α1 ln Nmt−1 + α2 ln Nmt−2 + α3 ln Amt−1 + α4Xmt−1
+ ηm + ηt + εmt,
(2.1)
where Nm represents the number of merger proposals submitted to the Commis-
sion, Am represents the total number of merger policy actions, and Xm represents
the vector of industry-specific characteristics. The terms ηm and ηt are indus-
try and time fixed-effects, respectively. Furthermore, extensive testing indicates
that a model with two lagged dependent variables best captures merger waves in
our samples of merger activity levels. This finding is in line with the precedents
in the literature [Seldeslachts et al., 2009, Clougherty and Seldeslachts, 2013] –
literature which similarly include two lags of the dependent variable. We will
also correct the error term εmt by clustering at the industry level. Assuming
clustered standard errors over the panel mitigates to some extent any remaining
serial correlation in the merger series, and also represents the preferred current
practice in the deterrence of crime literature [Donohue and Wolfers, 2005].
We lag the Merger Policy Actions variable and the industry control factors by
one year for two reasons. First, due to the matching of different datasets and
slightly different year bases (fiscal year versus calendar year), it is the easiest
means to ensure that the explanatory variables precede the dependent variable.
Second, it remedies to some extent the potential endogeneity of the explanatory
variables due to simultaneity bias. For example, industry concentration may
go up due to increased levels of merger activity. Moreover, our merger policy
variables potentially involve simultaneity-based endogeneity since merger policy
actions are a likely function of the number of notified mergers. Accordingly, we
follow best practices in the deterrence literature where scholars have begun to lag
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the deterrence variables to mitigate endogeneity issues [e.g., Katz et al., 2003].13
Finally, we log-transform our merger frequency and merger policy variables
in order to yield additional estimation advantages. In particular, Donohue and
Wolfers [2005] point out that measuring deterrence requires the consideration of
scaling issues. It should also be noted that by employing the log of the abso-
lute number of merger policy actions, our regression specification departs slightly
from the conditional probabilities setup indicative of many empirical studies of
deterrence that follow Becker [1968] and Ehrlich [1973]. However, constructing
conditional probabilities would generate a linked variable in the construction of
both the left-hand-side and right-hand-side variables; i.e., the number of notified
mergers would show up both in the dependent variable and in the merger policy
variables. As is extensively argued – first, by Klein et al. [1978] and, more re-
cently, by Donohue and Wolfers [2005] – any measurement error in these linked
variables could potentially lead to biased coefficient estimates that would favour
empirically finding deterrence effects.
After investigating whether merger policy actions as a whole involve deterrence
effects, our second set of empirical tests involves considering in detail how different
merger policy instruments affect future merger activity levels. By doing so, we
not only consider merger policy actions in more detail, but also investigate the
implications of shifting from one merger policy instrument towards other merger
policy instruments. Such substitutions between instruments may also impact
deterrence, as different merger policy tools might send different signals to firms
about the toughness of the competition authority. Accordingly, we estimate the
13 Although lagging our explanatory variables eliminates correlation with contemporaneous
error terms and substantially reduces the potential for bias in these coefficient estimates,
lagged variables may still be potentially correlated with past error terms. If this is the case,
then lagged explanatory variables are predetermined. However, this is less of a problem as
compared to having endogenous variables. Predetermined variables can also potentially yield
biased coefficient estimates [Bond, 2002], but they involve far less bias than do endogenous




ln Nmt = α0 + α1 ln Nmt−1 + α2 ln Nmt−2 + β1 ln R1mt−1 + β2 ln W1mt−1
+ β3 ln R2mt−1 + β4 ln P2mt−1 + α4Xmt−1 + ηm + ηt + εmt,
(2.2)
where the different merger policy actions are now included separately in the
specification (see again Table 2.1 for an exact definition).
2.4.2 Estimation Issues
We will first estimate our two basic models with the OLS method: the bench-
mark upon which to consider two additional estimation methods. We will also
fully estimate our two models (1 and 2) by employing the fixed-effects estimation
method, hence the coefficient estimates for these estimations should be consid-
ered within estimators. One issue regarding the estimation of this specification,
however, is that the lagged dependent variables are endogenous by construction
[Nickell, 1981, Arellano and Bond, 1991]. Hence, the endogenous nature of lagged
merger proposals should in principle be taken into account in order to obtain con-
sistent coefficient estimates. Thus while our main results hinge on the fixed effects
within estimators, our third estimation method will involve employing a dynamic
panel data model by means of the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano
and Bover [1995]. This instrumental variables estimator mainly takes advantage
of the so-called ‘internal instruments’ – by using the lags of levels and the lags
of differences as instruments for the lagged dependent variables – to converge
on an unbiased estimator.14 This methodology has become the standard in the
literature to deal with dynamic panel data and is advocated by, e.g., Bertrand
et al. [2004] as apt in such an empirical context. However, the Arellano and
14 The GMM estimators can in principle also be used to instrument for our other explanatory
variables, i.e., the merger policy and industry control variables. However, we do not engage
in this estimation strategy. The system GMM estimator can easily use too many moment
conditions with respect to the number of available observations when instrumenting for
more than the lagged dependent variables, which could bias results for our merger policy
variables.
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Bover [1995] estimator only works well in situations where the number of periods
is small and the number of panels is large. Furthermore, this estimator may suf-
fer from overfitting due to the application of too many instruments [Roodman,
2009]. We will keep the number of instruments limited in order to ameliorate the
potential for overfitting, and our sample seemingly satisfies the necessary crite-
ria (with its 37 panels and 18 periods). Nevertheless, in light of the potential
concerns regarding GMM estimation, we will cautiously interpret our estimation
results.
In sum, we will present results based on OLS, fixed-effects, and system-GMM
estimators for our base regression specifications (2.1) and (2.2). We believe that
our results should be robust if they hold irrespectively of the estimation proce-
dure.
2.4.3 Merger Waves and the 2004 Merger Policy Reform
Our next step involves fully taking into account the different phases of the merger
wave (Figure 2.2). To do so, we employ a more flexible specification structure
that allows the lagged dependent variables and the merger policy variables to
have a time-dependent effect on future merger activity levels. Specifically, we
consider the differential effect of lagged merger proposals and EU merger policy
instruments during three separate periods: 1990–1999 (p = 1), 2000–2003 (p = 2),
and 2004–2009 (p = 3). For this purpose, we interact the various policy variables
with the dummy variables for these periods. We therefore estimate – with the
fixed-effects estimator – the following regression specification, where Ip is an
indicator variable set equal to 1 if the relevant wave period is p:















As indicated, the additional advantage of this last regression specification is
that it allows accounting for possible changes over time in the deterrence proper-
ties of EU merger policy. In particular, the third period witnessed a fundamental
change in the merger control institutions, as this correlates with the period af-
ter the 2004 reforms. The 2004 reforms introduced a new substantive test that
evaluates the competitive effects of mergers (the Significant Impediment of Effec-
tive Competition test); and also involved improved timetables and guidelines, a
new efficiency defence for mergers, and the introduction of a Chief Competition
Economist. All in all, the goal of the reforms was to bring EU merger policy closer
to economic principles and further from per se rules (see, e.g., Lyons, 2009, Röller
and de la Mano, 2006, and Duso et al., 2013). Thus, it should prove interesting
to investigate whether these reforms yielded additional deterrence effects for the
various merger policy instruments.
2.4.4 Competitive Conditions
We further extend our basic framework to differentiate between high-competi-
tion and low-competition industries – a distinction which allows us to investigate
whether EU merger policy generates more deterrence in low-competition indus-
tries. As argued above in Section 2, our underlying working assumption is that
mergers occurring in low-competition industries will be more likely to be anti-
competitive, as compared to mergers occurring in high-competition industries.
We define high-competition/low-competition industries on the basis of two in-
dicators. First, we use the traditional measure of industry concentration: the
HHI. In particular, we use the HHI value employed by the Commission (HHI
≥ 0.2) in order to define a low-competition industry. Indeed, for values where the
HHI is higher than 0.2, mergers are generally challenged by the Commission when
they would lead to a small HHI increase (i.e., ∆HHI = 0.015). Given that this
threshold is also known to the population of firms, this is a natural benchmark
to separate high- and low-competition industries for the purposes of studying EU
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merger policy. Thus, the 0.2 HHI threshold should well represent the perceptions
of firms (both merging and non-merging) when considering what constitutes a
low- or high-competition industry.
Yet given the potential shortcomings of the HHI measure in capturing industry
competitiveness, we also apply the alternative measure of competition intensity
discussed above; i.e., the relative-profits measure recently developed by Boone
[2008]. Yet unlike with the HHI measure, there is no such natural threshold to
apply for Boone’s measure. Thus, we use the median value of this measure as
a threshold to differentiate between high- and low-competition industries. To
implement these estimations, we separately estimate equation (2.2) in the sub-
samples of high-competition and low-competition industries.15
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main Results
Table 2.3 reports the empirical results for the three regression estimations – OLS,
fixed-effects, and GMM – of the first specification, where we consider the deter-
rence effects involved with merger policy actions in general. Before considering
our variables of principal interest, we first discuss the appropriateness of our
estimation models and the relevance of the control variables. For all three spec-
ifications, the lagged dependent variables – as well as some of the merger wave
control variables – appear to affect merger activity in subsequent years and in-
dicate the expected signs. Hence, our empirical setup appears to be appropriate
as it is able to account for the wave-like pattern in merger behaviour. Moreover,
the two lagged dependent variables for merger activity levels appear to be rele-
vant. The first lagged dependent variable is positive and highly significant in all
three estimations. The second lagged dependent variable is positive in all three
15 We estimate these models via a sandwich estimator to take into account covariances between
industries and to easily compare the impact of high versus low-competition industries; see,
e.g., White [1996] for a discussion of sandwich estimators and their properties.
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Table 2.3: Main Analysis – Aggregated Actions
OLS Fixed Effects System GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Merger Proposalst−1 0.419∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.0534) (0.163)
Merger Proposalst−2 0.323∗∗∗ 0.0306 0.1000
(0.041) (0.0561) (0.0711)
Merger Policy Actionst−1 −0.071 −0.0509 −0.302
(0.050) (0.0456) (0.213)
HHIt−1 −0.528∗∗ 0.373 −2.243
(0.255) (0.355) (3.735)
Betat−1 (×100) −0.857 −0.968 −0.491
(0.924) (0.791) (1.080)
Salesgrowtht−1 (×10) −0.084 0.167 0.534
(0.392) (0.448) (0.140)
Tobinsqt−1 (×100) −0.012 −0.061∗∗ −0.067
(0.030) (0.029) (0.057)
Sharereturnt−1 0.133∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.045) (0.089)
Constant 0.508∗∗∗ 1.524∗∗∗ 0.673∗
(0.113) (0.170) (0.380)
Observations 637 637 637
R2 0.608 0.459
# of instruments 47
Sargan test 0.8655
Arellano-Bond test 0.1521
Notes: In column (1) we report the estimate from an OLS regression. In column (2)
we report the results from a panel fixed-effects regression. In column (3) we report
the results from the system GMM estimation to account for the dynamic nature
of our model. The dependent variable is the log of Merger Proposals. All merger
policy action variables are expressed in logs. In all regressions, we include year fixed-
effects. In columns (1) and (2) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered
at the industry level are reported in parentheses. In column (3) heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% significance levels is represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively. For the fixed-effects
estimates in column (2) we report the R2 within. We report the p-values for the
Sargan test of overidentification restrictions and for the Arellano-Bond test of zero
autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.
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estimations, but only significant for the OLS estimation. Yet, the inclusion of
two autoregressive terms is appropriate as the test for serial correlation in the
error term performs better with the inclusion of the second lag. Of the three
merger wave control variables (Salesgrowth, Sharereturn, and Tobinsq), Sharere-
turn appears to yield the most robust effect on future merger activity levels – a
positive and significant effect that provides support for the misvaluation theories
of merger behaviour.
Our competition measures (HHI and Beta) generally indicate a negative, though
insignificant, impact on merger activity levels. This negative coefficient estimate
is in line with the idea that the Commission scrutinises less competitive indus-
tries more closely. Hence, firms will be more hesitant to propose a merger in such
industries. Andrade and Stafford’s [2004] empirical study of merger waves also
expands on this logic. Yet the insignificance of these variables is likely due to the
fact that industries are quite heterogeneous in terms of competitiveness – an issue
which we will later discuss in more detail when we consider industry subsamples.
For our GMM estimations, the appropriateness and validity of the GMM instru-
ments requires two testable assumptions. First, in order to reach identification,
the disturbances must be serially uncorrelated – which is equivalent to having
no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Arellano-
Bond test find that the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation on the
error differences cannot be rejected, thus suggesting that serial correlation does
not exist (p ≥ 0.86). Second, the instruments must be uncorrelated with the
first-differenced residuals – an issue which can be tested using the Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan test yields evidence that one cannot re-
ject the hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term
(p-value 0.15). Accordingly, the GMM regression estimation passes the necessary
diagnostics and appears to be well specified.
Finally, our variable of principal interest – the Commission’s merger policy
actions – indicates a negative impact on future merger activity levels; yet, this
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effect is insignificant in all three estimations. These results suggest that merger
policy actions as a whole do not involve significant deterrence effects. With
these sobering results in mind, we move to our second specification where we
disaggregate the merger policy actions.
Table 2.4 presents the results for our estimations of the second regression spec-
ification. The two diagnostic tests (Arellano-Bond and Sargan) for the GMM
estimator again indicate that the necessary assumptions are present; hence, the
model appears to be relatively well specified. As can be seen from Table 2.4, the
coefficient estimates for the common constructs – the lagged merger proposals
variables, merger wave control variables and industry competitiveness measures
– are consistent with the results from the previous specification. For brevity
purposes, we will not discuss these common results here. We can thus look at
the empirical results while focusing on the variables of principal interest: the
relationship between the various merger policy tools and future merger activity
levels.
First, negotiated remedies taken in the initial investigation phase indicate a
negative impact on future merger activity levels in all three estimations – a coef-
ficient estimate that is significant at the 1% level for the fixed-effects estimation,
the 5% level for the OLS estimation, and the 10% level for the GMM estimation.
Second, the withdrawals that occur in Phase 1 are negative per expectation in two
estimations, but indicate insignificance in all three estimations. Third, remedies
in Phase 2 are positive, though insignificant, in all three estimations. Fourth,
Phase 2 Preventions are positive, though insignificant, in all three estimations.
The consistent negative impact of the Phase 1 Remedies variable indicates that
increasing the number of remedies in the early stages of merger control leads to
reduced merger activity levels in subsequent years. Thus, this result suggests that
a spike in the relative use of this particular merger policy instrument tends to send
a clear signal to firms that the Commission will be tougher in the application of
merger policy in the future. In terms of economic significance, if one were to take
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Table 2.4: Main Analysis – Disaggregated Actions
OLS Fixed Effects System GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Merger Proposalst−1 0.417∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.053) (0.285)
Merger Proposalst−2 0.322∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.278
(0.042) (0.055) (0.300)
P1 Remediest−1 −0.146∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.421∗
(0.057) (0.051) (0.242)
P1 Withdrawalst−1 −0.020 −0.039 0.243
(0.098) (0.076) (0.786)
P2 Remediest−1 0.008 0.077 0.106
(0.109) (0.098) (0.782)
P2 Preventionst−1 0.028 0.031 0.720
(0.148) (0.120) (1.704)
HHIt−1 −0.533∗∗ 0.367 −0.210
(0.254) (0.355) (0.513)
Betat−1 (×100) −0.897 −0.979 2.430∗∗
(0.906) (0.770) (1.230)
Salesgrowtht−1 (×10) −0.099 0.162 0.096
(0.389) (0.455) (0.581)
Tobinsqt−1 (×100) −0.007 −0.057∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.027) (0.056)
Sharereturnt−1 0.127∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ −0.037
(0.051) (0.043) (0.099)
Constant 0.522∗∗∗ 1.551∗∗∗ 0.396
(0.114) (0.163) (0.493)
Observations 637 637 637
R2 0.609 0.464
# of instruments 47
Sargan test 0.995
Arellano-Bond test 0.131
Notes: In column (1) we report the estimate from an OLS regression. In column (2) we
report the results from a panel fixed-effects regression. In column (3) we report the results
from the system GMM estimation to account for the dynamic nature of our model. The
dependent variable is the log of merger proposals. All merger policy action variables are
expressed in logs. In all regressions, we include year fixed-effects. In columns (1) and
(2) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported
in parentheses. In column (3) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels is represented by ∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ respectively. For the fixed-effects estimates in column (2) we report the R∗ within.
We report the p-values for the Sargan test of overidentification restrictions and for the
Arellano-Bond test of zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.
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the coefficient estimate for Phase 1 Remedies from the first estimation (0.146)
and consider the impact of a 1% increase in the application of that merger policy
action, then merger activity would tend to decrease in subsequent years by about
0.15% in a focal industry.
2.5.2 Results over Time
When we consider the empirical results for our third specification (model 3) –
where the merger policy variables are interacted with the period dummies – we
find additional evidence that Phase 1 Remedies uniquely involve deterrence ef-
fects. Table 2.5 reports the results for the estimations of this third regression
specification, and the results clearly indicate that Phase 1 Remedies are the only
merger policy instrument that appears to involve consistent and robust deterrence
effects. While Phase 1 Remedies indicate the expected negative effect on future
merger activity levels for all three periods, this influence is only significant at
the 5% level for the first (1990–2000) and last periods (2005–2009). In addition,
the coefficient estimate for the last period is greater than that in the first period
(−0.213 versus −0.15); though, this difference is not statistically significant. It
can thus be tentatively concluded that the 2004 merger reforms did not yield
significantly greater deterrence effects when it comes to merger policy – a result
which will be further discussed in the next section on policy implications.
2.5.3 Results for Low- versus High-Competition
Industries
We will now take a more detailed look at whether merger policy actions generate
a differential impact in industries due to the levels of competitiveness in the
industry. First, we divide industries into high-competition and low-competition
in terms of their HHI. Recall that we employ a cut-off point of HHI = 0.2, as this is
the threshold used by the Commission in classifying industries for merger policy.
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Table 2.5: Time Periods
1990–2000 2001–2003 2004–2009
(1) (2) (3)
Merger Proposalst−1 0.100 0.078 0.236∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.076) (0.075)
Merger Proposalst−2 0.070 −0.014 −0.056
(0.060) (0.073) (0.098)
P1 Remediest−1 −0.150∗∗ −0.116 −0.213∗∗
(0.064) (0.118) (0.103)
P1 Withdrawalst−1 0.094 0.034 −0.339
(0.096) (0.172) (0.242)
P2 Remediest−1 0.132 0.020 −0.080
(0.134) (0.172) (0.183)
















Notes: We report the estimate from a panel fixed-effects regression. The dependent variable
is the log of merger proposals. All merger policy action variables are expressed in logs. In all
regressions, we include year fixed-effects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at
the industry level are reported in parentheses. For reading purposes, we report the coefficients’
estimates of the interaction between the variable of interest and a dummy indicator for the three
periods in the upper part of each column. The coefficients’ estimates for the control variables
(HHI, Beta, Salesgrowth, Tobinsq, and Sharereturn) are instead not interacted with the time
periods dummies and are thus the same for all time periods; therefore, they are reported only
once. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels is represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗. We
report the R2 within.
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As such, this classification can perhaps be best viewed as whether firms perceive
industries to be competitive or not according to the Commission’s estimation,
as mergers falling in industries that are above this threshold will be subject to
heavy scrutiny by the Commission (at least in the initial stages of the merger
review process). As can be seen from the first two columns of Table 2.6, Phase
1 Remedies induce a reduction in future merger activity levels in both low and
high-competition industries. However, deterrence effects appear to be greatest
in low-competition industries, as the coefficient estimate (−0.32) for Phase 1
Remedies in low-competition industries is significantly lower than the coefficient
estimate (−0.104) for Phase 1 Remedies in high-competition industries.
The fact that Phase 1 Remedies involve more substantial deterrence in low-
competition industries as compared to high-competition industries is indeed en-
couraging. This result indicates that deterrence effects manifest where it is most
desirable from a welfare perspective. In particular, low-competition industries
are more likely to involve anticompetitive mergers, thus it would seem that low-
competition industries would be most influenced by changes in the tenor of merger
policy. Furthermore, this result provides some credibility for our methodological
approach in the sense that the empirical results are consistent with the idea that
it is anticompetitive mergers that are mostly deterred by merger policy.
We move now to the empirical results for our second indicator of industry com-
petitiveness: Boone’s Beta. This measure might better capture an industry’s
competitiveness; though, it should be noted that the HHI measure does align rel-
atively well with EU merger control practice, and particularly with how industries
are initially screened by the Commission. According to the Boone classification
of industry competitiveness, Phase 1 Remedies also yield a more robust impact
in low-competition industries as compared to high-competition industries. How-
ever, neither coefficient estimate is significant. Thus, Phase 1 Remedies yield
significantly more deterrence in low-competition industries when the traditional
HHI classification is employed; yet, Boone’s measure of industry competitiveness
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Table 2.6: High Competition versus Low Competition
HHI Beta
(Threshold 0.2) (Threshold Median)
High Low High Low
Competition Competition Competition Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Merger Proposalst−1 0.093 0.040 0.003 0.157∗∗
(0.061) (0.113) (0.059) (0.070)
Merger Proposalst−2 0.046 −0.283∗∗∗ −0.067 0.039
(0.058) (0.080) (0.070) (0.081)
P1 Remediest−1 −0.104∗ −0.320∗∗ −0.090 −0.131
(0.056) (0.139) (0.060) (0.089)
P1 Withdrawalst−1 −0.036 0.020 −0.114 0.174∗∗
(0.080) (0.229) (0.123) (0.085)
P2 Remediest−1 0.119 0.285 0.055 0.0551
(0.096) (0.266) (0.119) (0.154)
P2 Preventionst−1 −0.057 0.741∗∗∗ 0.046 0.0484
(0.115) (0.280) (0.145) (0.183)
HHIt−1 −1.357 0.359 −0.727 0.740∗∗
(0.847) (0.542) (0.520) (0.363)
Betat−1 (×100) −0.630 −0.700 −0.543 −1.760
(0.951) (1.040) (0.888) (1.110)
Salesgrowtht−1 (×10) 0.991 −0.433 1.390∗ −0.129
(0.723) (0.493) (0.808) (0.564)
Tobinsqt−1 (×100) 0.291∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.060) (0.020) (0.027) (0.024)
Sharereturnt−1 0.210∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.054
(0.077) (0.041) (0.095) (0.041)
Constant 1.508∗∗∗ 2.293∗∗∗ 2.321∗∗∗ 1.809∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.285) (0.223) (0.355)
Observations 532 105 320 317
R2 0.660 0.686 0.662 0.673
Notes: We report the estimate from a panel fixed-effects regression. The dependent
variable is the log of merger proposals. All merger policy action variables are ex-
pressed in logs. In all regressions,we include year fixed-effects. The threshold for
high vs. low competition is chosen to be the median in the case of beta, while for the
HHI we use the threshold value adopted in the EU competition policy to define the
concentrated-market region (HHI = 0.2). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the industry level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% significance levels is represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗.
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yields no such statistically significant differences.
2.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
We set out here to investigate the deterrence effects involved with EU merger
control. In particular, our aim was to uncover which specific merger policy in-
struments lead to forgone merger activity in subsequent years. The striking and
consistent finding from our empirical results is that Phase 1 Remedies appear to
uniquely involve deterrence in the European context. On the other hand, merger
policy actions as a whole – as well as preventions, Phase 2 Remedies, and Phase
1 Withdrawals – do not appear to yield substantial deterrence effects.
Several potential related explanations exist as to why Phase 1 Remedies yield
significant deterrence effects while Phase 2 Remedies do not. First, the Commis-
sion has higher bargaining power in the initial stage of the merger review process,
since merging firms are generally eager to reach a deal relatively quickly and avoid
the costs involved with waiting for the consummation of the merger in Phase 2
of the review process. As Clougherty [2005] notes, a delay represents a holdup to
the intended strategy of the merging firms, hence higher levels of scrutiny that
push off the benefits of the transaction reflect higher costs for merging firms.
Salop [2013a] also argues that delays are costly as they increase the likelihood
of failure for merging firms. Given that merging firms have a substantial inter-
est in getting their transaction approved as quickly as possible, they are likely
to agree to relatively substantial remedies in the early stages of the merger re-
view process [Dertwinkel-Kalt and Wey, 2012]. Following this logic, the remedies
agreed to during the initial stage should be remedies that involve a substantial
cost to merging parties. Thus, an uptick in these types of remedies will represent
a significant deterrent to future merger behaviour.
Phase 2 Remedies, however, do not indicate significant deterrence effects in our
various regression estimations. This result could be based on the same logic as
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above concerning bargaining-power being a function of the potential to delay the
onset of the merger. Once a merger has reached Phase 2 of the merger review
process, then much less scope exists for the Commission to delay the onset of the
merger. Instead, the only recourse at this stage given to the Commission is the
ability to threaten a potential prohibition. However, the Commission – and other
competition policy authorities – rarely employ prohibitions as an instrument of
merger policy; e.g., Clougherty and Seldeslachts [2013] report that only 0.072%
of notified merger transactions receive a prohibition in the U.S. context. With
prohibitions being a relatively rare event, this suggests then that the bargaining
power of the Commission will be severely curtailed in Phase 2. Consequently,
the remedies offered up by merging parties in Phase 2 will be generally less
substantial than those offered up in Phase 1. Thus, these Phase 2 Remedies
will be less likely to represent a deterrent to future merger behaviour in that
focal industry. In line with these priors, Duso et al. [2011] find that remedies
negotiated by the Commission in Phase 1 tend to be more effective at reducing
anticompetitive effects, as compared to remedies negotiated by the Commission
in Phase 2.
Furthermore, not only do prohibitions tend to be rare events in all jurisdictions,
they have become increasingly rare in the EU context after several setbacks in
the courts in the early 2000s. In fact, for quite some time the Commission has
been quite weary to employ preventions as a merger policy tool.16 Thus, it is fair
to conjecture that drawn-out negotiations that get relatively close to the 90-day
deadline will tend to find the Commission’s bargaining power to substantially
diminish. In essence, the only real option for the Commission in these later
stages of the merger review process is to accept the less substantial remedies
being offered by the merging parties before the negotiation phase ends.
In addition to Phase 2 Remedies, Phase 1 Withdrawals and Phase 2 Preven-
tions also do not involve substantial deterrence effects. The fact that preventions
16 In recent years, this has changed again. But these years are not included in our dataset.
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do not yield deterrence seems somewhat surprising, as preventions impose the
highest possible cost on merging firms. However, the fact that preventions have
been seldom employed over the last twenty years by the Commission potentially
explains why our analysis is unable to detect any significant deterrent effect for
this particular policy instrument. Furthermore, the lack of substantial deterrence
effects for Phase 1 Withdrawals may be due to the fact that withdrawals do not
send a clear signal about the Commission’s stance in that particular industry. A
number of withdrawals in the initial stage of the merger review process may be
due to internal reasons to the merging parties – rationales that are independent of
EU merger policy. Accordingly, an uptick in the number of Phase 1 Withdrawals
might very well be a noisy signal that does not provide clear information to firms
about the actual costs involved with navigating the merger review process. As
such, the lack of clear deterrence effects for this merger policy instrument makes
intuitive sense.
In terms of policy prescriptions, our results indicate that maximising deterrence
– at least according to the current EU merger policy regime – requires the use
of Phase 1 Remedies. Phase 1 Remedies should be applied relatively frequently,
as this is simply the only merger policy instrument which appears to involve
robust deterrence effects. The Commission’s behaviour does tend to partially
conform to these priors, as Phase 1 Remedies are employed more than twice as
frequently as Phase 2 Remedies. Furthermore, the application of more preventions
in Phase 2 of the merger review process may lead to greater deterrence effects for
Phase 2 Remedies. Indeed, if firms believe that preventions are a relatively likely
outcome when negotiations break down during Phase 2, then these firms would
perhaps be more willing to accept tougher remedies during these later stages of
negotiation. In addition to this indirect effect regarding Phase 2 Remedies, an
increase in preventions would also, of course, impose the highest possible cost
upon merging firms. Thus, it would likely induce more deterrence in a direct
manner. Accordingly, the very recent turn in EU merger policy to reembrace
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the employment of preventions (Aegean Airlines/Olympic Air in 2011, Deutsche
Börse/NYSE Euronext in 2012, TNT express/UPS in 2013, and Ryanair/Air
Lingus in 2013) would be a healthy practice in terms of generating deterrence
effects.
We do not find that the 2004 merger reforms towards using more economics
in competition policy have an additional impact on deterrence. This result adds
an element to the continuing debate on how merger policy should ideally work.
Legal scholars often argue that deterrence works best when policy is predictable
and more certain [Calfee and Craswell, 1984, Craswell and Calfee, 1986]. Thus
according to legal scholarship, the case-by-case approach favoured by economists,
would add too much unpredictability to the merger review process. Economists,
on the other hand, argue that the application of economic principles will increase
the efficiency and correctness of individual decisions, and therefore reduce the
errors in assessing the anticompetitiveness of mergers. This, in turn, should
enhance the deterrence effects involved with merger policy actions. Indeed, errors
in decision-making typically lead to less deterrence [Davies and Majumdar, 2002].
Our results suggest that both argumentations may contain some element of truth:
switching to a more economics-based approach has not increased nor decreased
deterrence effects.
Finally, we find that the deterrence effects involved with Phase 1 Remedies
work best in the low-competition industries: where the HHI is above 0.2, the cut-
off level employed by the Commission in order to define an industry as exhibiting
a lack of competition. This result is, in our view, encouraging for two reasons.
First, it indicates that EU merger policy actions involve greater deterrence in
low-competition industries according to the Commission’s definition. This is, of
course, desirable as these industries are already highly concentrated and it would
be beneficial to discourage further merger activity in these industries. Further-
more, this result is consistent with Phase 1 Remedies deterring mostly anticom-
petitive mergers. Indeed, all else equal, mergers in more concentrated industries
42
2.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
are by definition more anticompetitive. Taken together, we can tentatively con-
clude that deterrence takes place mainly in those industries where it matters most,
and that this deterrence is desirable in terms of which type of mergers are being
deterred. This previous result – and our subsequent deductions about the type of
mergers being deterred – is also in line with a recent study by Duso et al. [2013].
In a small sample of 368 mergers being scrutinised by the EC over the 1990–2007
period (mergers which represent a subsample of our dataset), they consider the
share prices of non-merging rival firms in order to identify whether a particular
merger is anticompetitive or not. Using this methodology, Duso et al. [2013] find
that if the Commission applies more Phase 1 Remedies, then the likelihood that
a proposed merger is anticompetitive is reduced. This result, however, only holds
for the period after the 2004 reforms. Combining their results with the results
from our study would suggest that Phase 1 Remedies induce firms (i) to propose
fewer (anticompetitive) mergers in subsequent years and (ii) to propose mergers
that are less damaging in terms of consumer welfare.
Perhaps more sobering is the fact that when we classify industries on the basis
of Boone’s Beta (a measure based on a firm’s elasticity of profits with respect
to costs), we do not find greater deterrence effects in low-competition industries.
This could indicate that both the Commission act and merging firms only react
optimally in terms of welfare conform industry concentration measures (the HHI),
while perhaps more sophisticated measures of competition would perhaps give a
different picture. Of course, to know whether this is really the case, clearly more
research in this dimension is needed.
In sum, we find Phase 1 Remedies to be effective and Phase 2 Remedies and
preventions to be ineffective in the deterrence of future merger frequencies. The
weak deterrence implications of Phase 2 Remedies and preventions may be a
concern for EU competition policy in light of the fact that this suggests that
the Commission does not appear to generate robust deterrence from any of its
enforcement efforts that take place in the later stages of the merger review process.
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To the degree that EU competition authorities are concerned about the deterrence
implications of merger policy, our results suggest that they may want to move
more enforcement actions to the initial stages, or employ more preventions in
order to create more bargaining power in the secondary stage.
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3 European Merger Control and
Deterrence: A Firm-Level
Analysis
‘Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy . . . the FEAR to attack!’
– Dr. Strangelove in ‘Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Bomb’ (1964)
3.1 Introduction
Competition policy may be defined as ‘the set of policies and laws which ensure
that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to reduce
economic welfare’ [Motta, 2004, p. 30]. European competition policy is mainly
rooted in Articles 101 and 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
with first efforts towards cross-border competition rules dating back to the 1950s.
Article 1011 related to anticompetitive agreements and Article 1022 to the abuse
of a dominant position. Merger control, therefore, was initially not an explicit
part of European competition policy. To apply either provision so as to include
mergers was highly uncertain to say the least, if not ruled out in general.
At the same time, it was widely recognised among academics and practitioners
that mergers could have important effects on competitive conditions [Russo et al.,
1 Formerly Article 81 Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC).
2 Formerly Article 82 TEC.
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2010] and, despite possible positive synergy effects, required ex ante policing
and control. As a result of such considerations, the Merger Regulation 19893
was adopted, requiring firms to notify mergers to the European Commission
(Commission). European merger control hence formally has existed since 1990
when the Merger Regulation 1989 was implemented and the first European merger
case was notified.4
Further practice made it necessary to extend the scope of Merger Regulation
1989 in the new Merger Regulation 2004,5 which set forth a new standard to
assess the competitive impact of mergers, commonly referred to as the SIEC test.6
The new standard widens the grounds to prohibit a merger, that is, independent
of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, mergers which might
significantly impede effective competition will be barred.
In the course of the past years, landmark cases have become responsible in fur-
ther shaping competition policy in Europe. For example, the grounds on which
mergers would be prohibited for fear of coordinated effects in the market have
been specified.7 The central enforcement body of merger control, the Directorate-
General for Competition in the European Commission (DG Comp), further saw
the need to set forth guidelines for nonhorizontal mergers in 2008 as anticompet-
itive instances of vertically integrating businesses increasingly took place.8
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertak-
ings, OJ L 395/1, as amended.
4 Renault/Volvo OJ 1990 C254/04, Case M.4.
5 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
OJ L24/1. References, unless otherwise noted, relate to the Merger Regulation 2004.
6 Article 2(3), Significant Impediment of Effective Competition (SIEC test), see also Commis-
sion Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on
the control of concentrations between undertakings OJO C 31/5.
7 For example, Nestlé/Perrier Commission decision 92/553/EEC [1992] OJ L 356/1, Case
IV/M.190; Airtours/First Choice Commission decision 2000/276/EC [1999] OJ L 93/1,
Case IV/M.1524; Sony/BMG Commission decision 2005/188/EC [2004] summary of the
decision in OJ L 62/30, Case COMP/M.3333; see also summaries in Vickers [2004] and
Bellis [2009].
8 Guidelines on the assessment of nonhorizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on
the control of concentrations between undertakings OJ C 265/6; for example, World-
com/MCI Commission decision 99/287/EC [1999] OJ L 116/1, Case COMP/M.1069; Tetra
Laval/Sidel Commission decision 2004/124/EC [2004] OJ L 43/13, Case COMP/M.2416:
Google/DoubleClick Commission decision 2005/590/EC [2005] summary of the decision in
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With more than 20 years of European merger control practice and enforcement,
the central question thus arises whether competition policy in general and merger
control in particular has ex post met its initial objectives and has had a socially
beneficial effect [Buccirossi et al., 2013]. An important question related to the
above is with which methods one could possibly measure the effectiveness, while
at the same the prevailing view is that no really convincing empirical evidence
about the effectiveness of the antitrust enforcement regime has yet been found
[Baker, 2003, Crandall and Winston, 2003, Carlton, 2009].
Given the publicly accessible information on all notified European mergers dur-
ing the last 20 years, an empirical ex post analysis – next to a purely qualitative
review – of merger policy becomes increasingly meaningful and to some extent im-
perative. In addition, as the legislative history reflects, merger control has gained
greatly in significance and it has been widely recognised among theorists and
practitioners as having large implications on all other areas of antitrust [Kovacic,
2009].
Ex post measurement of the effectiveness of merger control may be approached
from different angles. It has been proposed to assess the strength and quality
of legal enforcement by examining more closely any potential (over- or under-
)deterrence and Type I and Type II errors when enforcing and interpreting the
rules [Buccirossi, 2010].
The central rationale for considering deterrence is the fact that a merger deci-
sion not only has direct effects on the filing parties, but conceivably also indirect
effects on future filings of other firms observing the merger decision [Sørgard,
2009, Salop, 2013b]. From a policy perspective, the right deterrent effects should
increase future effectiveness and efficiency of merger control since the outside
world would pick up the proper signals sent by the authority and subsequently
adjust its filings accordingly. As a result of firms internalizing the rules and policy
actions, less and less case-by-case regulation will become necessary. Ultimately,
OJ C 184/10 [2008]; ENI/EDP/GDP Commission decision 2005/801/EC [2004] summary
of the decision in OJ L 302/69, Case COMP/M.3440.
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in a world of a perfect merger control with no errors of judgment and a com-
plete degree of deterrence, the merger authority would in fact receive only good
or welfare-increasing merger filings and no bad filings. The degree of interven-
ing, prohibiting, and remedying mergers by the authority would be reduced to
nil. While such scenario sounds as yet unrealistic and we can assume that some
amount of imperfect enforcement [Buccirossi, 2010] will persist9 in the long run,
a well-established deterrence system means in any case that the authority will be
able to save manpower and resources and shift its efforts on (the few remaining)
ambivalent or complex cases.
Type I and Type II errors refer to the extent the authority is able to correctly
make a decision in accordance with the policy goals it wishes to achieve. In a
merger context, an effective authority should try to maximise welfare by neither
clearing systematically too many welfare-decreasing mergers10 nor prohibiting
too many welfare-increasing mergers, and it should strive to influence the future
merging behaviour of the companies in such way that less bad and more good
mergers are notified.
While the quality of merger control depends on both the error proneness of the
authority and the deterrent effects of its enforcement [Sørgard, 2009], this paper
will focus on the deterrent aspect of enforcement.
The foremost difficulty with adequately assessing deterrence is its absence of
data. By definition, deterrence implies that some decisions which would have
manifested themselves publicly once they were taken were not made by the par-
ties. The sample we have publicly available representing the merger data of the
last 20 years must qualify as the outright antithesis of deterrence or rather the
tip of the iceberg [Seldeslachts et al., 2009] in the sense that it fails to reflect the
9 In the same vein, deterrence in merger control by definition feeds to some extent on Type
I errors of the authority: Over- and underdeterrence might stem from varying degrees of
severity in remedies decisions, but not from prohibitions per se. Prohibitions which would
not exist in the perfect world would then be made in the form of Type I errors thereby
potentially deterring outsiders to make a filing.
10 Whatever the Commission’s welfare standard may be.
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full extent of merger policy effects [Davies and Ormosi, 2012]. It is the prevailing
view, however, that the full extent of deterrent effects must be large.
In the face of data limitations, my paper addresses a first methodical step
towards an incrementally refined measurement of deterrence. To approximate the
extent of deterrence, I estimate the probability of notifying an anticompetitive
merger given the past policy actions of the Commission and other explanatory
control variables. The novelty in this approach is that units of observations are
broken down to the merger level, whereas past papers used variables aggregated
by industry or time [Duso et al., 2013]. This is a unique step as it combines firm-
level information of the involved merging firms with information on the merger
case covering a timespan of the past 20 years. From a methodological point
of view, this is an obvious starting point for a more precise measurement of
deterrence. My approach, albeit a necessary first step, falls short of measuring the
complete extent of deterrence inasmuch as such measuring implies the inclusion
of the whole iceberg – not only its tip.
Section 2 discusses the concept of deterrence in merger control and its inherent
measuring challenges and provides an overview of past literature; Section 3 intro-
duces the model for the estimation equation, while Section 4 describes the data
and variables which were used for the estimation. The section will also briefly
summarise the merger procedure of the European Commission and furnish some
basic statistics on the merger decisions covering the entire merger history. Sec-
tion 5 will discuss results of the estimation, while I will draw conclusions from
the estimation in Section 6.
3.2 Deterrence
Early research into deterrent effects of competition policy focused on simple be-
fore/after comparisons of notified mergers. Stigler [1966], for example, by looking
at changes in the composition of U.S. mergers before vs. after the 1950 anti-merger
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amendment to the Clayton Act, found that the amendment must have had a de-
terring effect on horizontal mergers, since the share of horizontal mergers shrunk
considerably. Stigler did not run any regressions at that time, which makes it
difficult to draw any valid conclusions from his statistical exercise. Nevertheless,
the merit of his analysis lies in the fact that he was one of the first scholars to form
a connection between merging behaviour and government action so as to grasp
potential deterrent effects of legal enforcement. Eckbo and Wier [1985] followed
Stigler’s approach and compared mergers before and after the U.S. Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act to gain insights about deterrent effects. Measuring the outside (rival)
firms’ stock market premiums before and after the reform, their results suggest
that less anticompetitive mergers were filed after the reform. The results still put
into doubt the fact that those mergers which were picked up by the authority for
investigation after the reform tended to be more anticompetitive than those not
investigated; Eckbo and Wier did not find conclusive evidence that the reform
had led to a more efficient identification and selection process of anticompetitive
mergers.
The deterrence concept of public enforcement originally stems from the eco-
nomics of crime literature and is based on the idea that the punishment of crim-
inals is observed and probabilities of being captured and punished are being
updated by potential offenders [Becker, 1968]. The deterrence of criminals thus
depends on whether the expected profit of a crime exceeds the expected punish-
ment. According to this strand of literature, criminals posit a detection proba-
bility for their decision with such probability being a function of the authority’s
past performance which they have observed. Effective deterrence then means
that the severity of punishment and the high detection probability renders the
crime unprofitable.
The concept can be applied to the merger context analogously: Firms contem-
plating a merger observe the policy decisions taken by the European Commission
to decide whether or not to file for an intended merger [Seldeslachts et al., 2009].
50
3.2 Deterrence
They will update their expectations on the Commission’s actions and adjust their
decisions accordingly. It is not enough to deter any merger – with the appropri-
ate merger policy, firms should be encouraged to notify procompetitive mergers
and deterred to notify anticompetitive mergers. Seldeslachts et al. [2009], instead
of using conditional probabilities, used absolute numbers of actions and looked
at their impact on the frequency of mergers over 28 antitrust jurisdictions be-
tween 1992–2005. Their unit of observation is a jurisdiction. Their main result is
that prohibitions have a deterrent effect on future merger frequencies, while other
merger policy tools have no impact. As they outline, firms make inferences as
to antitrust stances, i.e., the parameters eliciting a specific kind of action, given
the past decision history and the imperfect information on the parameters of pre-
viously proposed mergers. They react to and update their expectations in the
face of a jurisdictional change, as it means that jurisdictional decision thresholds
might have shifted and probabilities for specific decisions altered.
Clougherty and Seldeslachts [2013] made further advances into this topic by
applying the conditional probabilities methodology employed by the economics
of crime literature. They regressed conditional probabilities as explanatory vari-
ables11 constructed from the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission data against the number of horizontal mergers and composition of
mergers between 1986–1999. The unit of observation is the 2-digit Standard In-
dustry Classification (SIC) industry. Their result was that merger challenges12
had a strong deterring effect on horizontal mergers.
Clougherty et al. [2013b] take a frequency-based and industry-level approach
towards deterrence: Using the entire merger data from the European Commission
and matching the data at an industry level with aggregated firm data, they run
regressions of merger notifications against the Commission’s merger decisions
differentiated in kind. They find Phase 1 Remedies sending strong signals into
11 E.g., the investigation rate, i.e., the number of investigations divided by the number of
prohibitions.
12 E.g., policy actions divided by the number of investigations.
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the market, whereas merger policy actions as a whole do not seem to have a
significant deterrent effect. With respect to Phase 1 Remedies, the result is that
they work best in low-competition industries. They use the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index and Boone’s Beta to measure the degree of competition in the respective
industries. Clougherty et al. [2013b] control for merger waves, industry-specific
determinants of mergers, and industry and time fixed-effects.
Duso et al. [2013] depart from the past deterrence approach by identifying an-
ticompetitive mergers in their sample. As part of an overall economic assessment
of the 2004 European merger reform look at how past decisions affect the prob-
ability of a merger to be anticompetitive by estimating a probit equation. They
use a subsample of the EU merger dataset of 326 mergers and add information
on competitors. Their identification strategy for anticompetitiveness is to look
at stock market reactions to merger announcements.13 As a novelty in the me-
thodical approach, the authors undertake to measure not only the quantitative
(frequency) side, but also the qualitative effects of deterrence, that is, whether
merger control has been able to deter bad mergers and encourage good mergers
(good deterrence). They find a negative and significant effect of Phase 1 Reme-
dies and prohibitions in the period before the reform on anticompetitive mergers.
There seems to have been a policy shift after 2004 where the number of prohibi-
tions went down radically; after the reform, withdrawals and abortions seems to
have partially substituted for prohibitions in its deterrent effect.
This paper is similar in approach as Duso et al. [2013], but then combines a
more comprehensive range of merger cases with the corporate financial data of
Thomson Reuters Worldscope and the Thomson Reuters SDC M&A data. Iden-
tifying past mergers as competitive or anticompetitive according to the profit
differentials method discussed below, it measures the effect past merger decisions
have had on the probability of filing an anticompetitive merger. Duso et al.
[2013], while not only using a small subsample of the merger database for their
13 Cumulative aggregate abnormal returns, CAARs.
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analysis, identified anticompetitive mergers with stock market reactions; I em-
ploy a different measure to tag anticompetitive mergers by achieving a one-to-one
match of the merging firms with external commercial data.14 The match with
external data has furthermore the advantage that it mitigates potential endo-
geneity issues arising out of regressing with data derived from information which
the merger authority uses for its decision [Bergman et al., 2005].
As mentioned above, this paper signifies a first step which needs to be taken
towards the measurement of deterrence beyond the tip of the iceberg. This would
mean that we ultimately estimate the probability for filing a merger given merger
and market characteristics and the firm’s expectations about how the Commission
will decide. As suggested by [Seldeslachts et al., 2009], to model deterrence as the
probability to merge given specific expectations of the merging parties shall bring
deterrence estimation considerably closer towards describing the iceberg and thus
going around the empirical self-selection problem.
3.3 Model
Merger notifications can be seen as a result of the firms’ reaction to the author-
ity’s merger policy and its decisions or a positive manifestation of the filing firms’
internal merger decision process. The merger database does not constitute a rep-
resentative sample of the true distribution of all contemplated mergers, as those
truly deterred, i.e., contemplated and abandoned even before a filing took place,15
14 Konings et al. [2001], while they only tackle deterrence indirectly, nevertheless take an
approach worth mentioning in this context: they investigate the impact of competition
policy in two European countries on the markets and the firms’ behaviour in the markets.
One of the notable features in the paper is that they use firm- level data. As the authors
point out, for an effects-based analysis of competition policy, disaggregating data becomes
important to increase the reliability and efficiency of the results by increasing the number
of observations and by better being able to grasp firm-level heterogeneity. Other studies on
the indirect effect of competition policy on firms’ market behaviour include: Crandall and
Winston [2003], Block et al. [1981], Warzynski [2001]; and Hoekman and Kee [2003]. They
will not be discussed as the results of all named papers do not specifically address deterrent
effects directly, independent of regulatory effects.
15 Including mergers which were abandoned after pre-notification consultations with the Com-
mission.
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are not included. Davies and Ormosi [2012] mention that rarely are also mergers
included in an analysis which are undeterred, but undetected, or undeterred, de-
tected, but uninvestigated. The self-selection bias stems from the fact that the
sample will on average include more welfare-increasing mergers, and tend to rule
out highly doubtful or controversial mergers. An accurate measurement of deter-
rence would have to capture the change in the amount of (i) deterred mergers,
and, following Davies and Ormosi’s taxonomy, also mergers which were (ii) not
deterred but not detected as anticompetitive, (iii) detected but not further inves-
tigated mergers, and (iv) detected as well as investigated mergers. Most studies
derive their analysis from the last or third and last group of mergers, whereas it
may be assumed that the first and second group could be of considerable size.
3.3.1 Logistic Regression Model
I start with a binary response model, where I define
dit =

1 : if merger i at time t is anticompetitive,
0 : otherwise.
dit is the realisation of the random variable Di which takes values 1 and 0 with
probabilities πit and 1 − πit. The Bernoulli distribution of Dit is
Pr{Dit = dit} = πditit (1 − πit)1−dit .
For my model, I assume that the probabilities depend on a vector of observed
covariates in an inverse logit form:
logit(πit) = I′itα + M′itβ + P′i,t−1δ + Z′itγ.
Since the dataset is cross-section in nature rather than a panel (see more de-
tailed explanations below under Merger Data), I have allocated time-industry-
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specific controls or time-specific policy variables to each merger i individually.16
For clarity’s sake, I have grouped the explanatory variables to Mit (merger vari-
ables), which contain information about the merging firms’ case experience, Iit
(industry variables), which contain information about the merging firm’s industry,
Pi,t−1 (policy variables), our main focus of interest, which relate to the decision
history which can be allocated to each merger i and Zit (time- and industry-
effect variables), which control for time trends and industry effects.17 I have
replaced Pi,t−1 with Ai,t−1 in some regressions where I summed up all individual
policy variables to one general Action Variable to see the aggregated effect. Dit
is an indicator variable of a merger’s anticompetitive nature (Dit = 1 in case of
anticompetitiveness). Thus the γ coefficients in this logit equation are of main
interest. The aim of the estimation is to find indications whether or not some past
decisions have had a negative effect on the probability of filing an anticompetitive
merger with the Commission.
The transformed equation will be:












For the estimation, I use the likelihood function
f(dit|Iit, Mit, Pi,t−1, Zit) = pditit (1 − pit)1−dit , dit = 0, 1,
where pit = Λ(I′itα + M′itβ + P′i,t−1γ + Z′itδ).
16 The dataset is strictly speaking a repeated cross-section over T time periods, encompassing
J industry sections in each time period. Hence, time effects and industry effects need to be
accounted for to a certain extent.
17 The industry effects constitute of dummy variables for each NACE section (A, B, C, . . . ).
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dit ln Λ(I′itα + M′itβ + P′i,t−1γ + Z′itδ)
+ (1 − dit) ln(1 − Λ(I′itα + M′itβ + P′i,t−1γ + Z′itδ))

.
The maximum likelihood first-order conditions are set equal to zero and con-
verge to the estimated coefficients.18
3.3.2 Anticompetitiveness
Effective deterrence in the context of merger control does not mean that mergers
are undiscriminatingly discouraged, but that less anticompetitive mergers and
more procompetitive mergers are notified over time. In order to implement the
described model specification, it is necessary to classify each merger as anticom-
petitive or non-anticompetitive. To that end, I employ the methodology of Gugler
et al. [2002] who compare the merging firms’ aggregated profit and sales differ-
entials before and after the merger with the same differentials of the merger’s
industry. Gugler et al.’s approach is closely linked to the theory of oligopoly;
they assume that mergers which increase market power and are thus anticompet-
itive19 show post merger that their profits increase while their post-merger sales
decrease. This should apply to any merger – horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate.
I therefore allocate sales and profits data taken from Worldscope and SDC to
the firms participating in a merger, if possible, for the whole timespan between
1990 and 2009 with respect to each merger. The matching process consisted of
18 A probit regression of the equation delivered results very close to the logit results. Using
the same selected specification for both probit and logit, the probit model showed a log
likelihood of −636.81, while the logit model had a log likelihood of −636.85. The displayed
standard errors are the result of the robust (or sandwich) estimator of variance (VCE). They
were clustered for years to account for correlation over time.
19 The paper notes that the net effect of the merger is meant with market power increase. All
mergers eliminate competition in a strict sense, but the net effect may increase efficiency




several rounds, the first round being an exact firm name match and the next
rounds involving fuzzy matching to account for spelling inconsistencies between
the databases, abbreviations and country-specific alterations. I was able to match
2574 of the 4148 mergers of the EU merger database. I then determine profit and
sales differentials between 1 year before merger and 1 year after merger:20
∆πi,t = πi,t+1 − πi,t−1,
with πi,t being defined as net income divided by assets.
For sales, I have
∆salesi,t = (salesi,t+1 − salesi,t−1)/salesi,t−1.
I aggregate the differentials on merger level and tag those mergers where the
profit differential – relative to the the mean industry profit differential – is pos-
itive and the sales differential – relative to the mean sales profit differential – is
negative, i.e.,
∆Π > 0, ∆S < 0.
3.3.3 Learning Effects
I account for learning effects of the merging companies by taking into account the
companies’ individual merger history in my regressions. I create two variables
which account for the number of cases the acquirer firm and the target firm,
respectively, have been involved up to the current case. By adding learning
effects, I control for the fact that firms who have already been a party to merger
notifications have profited from the experience in terms of know-how, and it
may be assumed that the higher the number of cases, the greater is the effect
20 Maximal 2 years before and after the merger if profit or sales data were missing. 2 year
forward lags were used in the case 1 year forward lags were missing, and 2 year lags were
used if 1 year lags were missing. I turned this process around by using 1 year (forward) lags
only in the case of 2 year (forward) lags which brought less significant results.
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of learning. The experience could range from improving know-how concerning
contacts with the authorities, improved knowledge of the law and procedure to
preparing merger notifications in a more effective way, i.e., increasing the chances
of being cleared.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 European Merger Control and Data
Merger Procedure
The merger procedure is formally being initiated by the notification of the merger
by the parties. Mergers need to be notified to the Commission if certain statutory
turnover thresholds for worldwide sales and in the EU are exceeded.21 Once a
notification is filed, the Commission has to follow a strict timeline for assessing
and evaluating the merger. A notification entails a first period of evaluating
the merger (Phase 1, 25 working days) and a second period of more detailed
appraisal if the Commission has ‘serious doubts as to its compatibility with the
common market’ (Phase 2, 90 working days).22 Informally, the merger procedure
usually starts earlier with pre-notification contacts between the notifying parties
and the Commission. Pre-notification contacts give the parties the opportunity
to discuss without precedence and in confidence the intended merger. Hence,
despite its informative nature for deterrence purposes, no data is available on
how many intended mergers were abandoned after pre-notification talks with the
Commission.
21 Combined worldwide turnover of at least 5 billion euros and a EEA-wide turnover of more
than 250 million euros for each of at least two of the participating firms (unless each merging





The bulk of notifications is decided or closed in Phase 123 and most Phase 1
cases is cleared with or without remedies.24 In Phase 1 the Commission must
either clear the merger with or without remedies, declare the merger to be out of
scope or, in case of serious doubts, open Phase 2 proceedings.25 The Commission
must conclude Phase 2 either by clearing the merger with or without remedies
or by prohibiting it.26 If the Commission decides to clear a merger subject to
remedies, these can either be structural or behavioural. Structural commitments
require a party to divest a business or sell stakes, whereas behavioural commit-
ments lead a party to change its behaviour for the sake of promoting competition
in the market.27
A table summarising the types of decisions with a reference to the respective
provision in the Merger Regulation 2004 is outlined below.
Table 3.1: Merger Decision Types
Phase 1 decision Phase 2 decision
25 working days 90 working days
Outside Scope 6.1a n.a.
Clearance (with or without remedies) 6.1b or 6.2 8.1b or 8.2
Prohibition n.a. 8.3 or 8.4
Note: Withdrawals by the parties are possible during Phase 1 and Phase 2.
23 96% of all notifications.
24 96% of all Phase 1 decisions including withdrawals in Phase 1.
25 Article 6. To this end the Commission has the power to request information in what is
referred to as Article 11 letters and investigative powers where it may examine books, other
business records and the undertakings’ premises.
26 Article 8. Compared to Phase 1, the Commission has more extensive investigative powers.
A prohibition is issued after a Statement of Objections has first been communicated to the
parties to which they may reply formally and request the right for an oral hearing. In both
phases, parties can withdraw from the notification. Of all Phase 2 decisions over the relevant
period, 23% were prohibitions (including withdrawals in Phase 2), 77% therefore clearances
with or without remedies. Third parties such as consumer associations and competitors also
have the right to be heard.
27 Behavioural commitments could, for example, be to terminate exclusivity agreements or to
open access to technology. The Commission adopted a Notice on Remedies to provide more
guidance on this issue in 2000 (updated in 2008).
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Merger Data
The merger data was downloaded from the publicly accessible merger database
of the European Commission which is made available by the website of the DG
Comp.28 The database contains 4253 cases between 1990 and 2009, that is,
notifications which were filed by the merging parties with the Commission even
if they were withdrawn at a later stage. Each case contains brief information on
the notification such as parties, date, case number, industry classification, and
the decision history such as type and date of decision(s).29
According to the development of the total number of notifications in the rel-
evant time period (Figure 3.1), the number of notifications grew continuously,
especially between 1995 and 2000 and after a peak in 2000, dropped in 2003
which is attributed to the dotcom bubble burst; it afterwards reached a new peak
in 2007 after which it continually dropped, as the 2008 financial crisis. As can be
seen, Figure 3.1 displays a wave-like pattern [Clougherty et al., 2013b].
By comparison, Figure 3.2 shows the number of matches which formed the
estimation sample, which reflects a pattern very similar to the total number of
notifications as represented by Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.3 shows the ratio of anticompetitive mergers to the total number of
notifications combined with the ratio of preventions to notifications. A caveat of
the graph must be made to the fact that the numbers on this graph reflect the
estimated sample only and not the complete European merger database. The
graph still reflects the feature that the peaks of anticompetitive mergers correlate
with the dips in preventions and vice versa. This can be seen quite clearly around
1998 and again in 2002–2004. One explanation for this phenomenon could indeed
28 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/.
29 10 cases were listed as notified with no further details. I assumed that the parties had
withdrawn from the merger and included the cases in the Phase 1 Withdrawals. 40 cases
concerned referrals to Member States (Articles 4.4, 9.3, or 9.4 Merger Regulation 2004)
(dropped). 1 case concerned an out-of-scope decision (Article 6.1a) (dropped). 7 cases on
fines (Article 14) and 1 case on Article 21 (applicability) were dropped, as the corresponding
notification entries had already existed in the database.
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be that notifications react to the decision practice of the Commission. After
the early 2000s, when some prohibition decisions were reversed by four seminal
European Court of First Instance judgments,30 the number of preventions drops
significantly, while the number of anticompetitive mergers increases constantly
and shows a few peaks in line with the general merger waves.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the decision types in Phase 1 and Phase 2
(after kicking out nonessential decision types as described above). All Phase 2
decisions are included in the Phase 1 decisions (as 6.1c decisions).
I have used the merger case data and allocated to each case the policy variables
Pi,t−1 which will serve as explanatory variables to my equation. Each merger i at
time t therefore has a set of policy variables on the sum of decisions of last year
from the date of notification of same merger (e.g., Sum of Phase 1 Remedies or
R1i,t−1, etc.). I also add the Sum of Notifications lagged by one year, or Ni,t−1,




Table 3.2: Phase 1 and 2 Decisions
Frequency Percent
Phase 1 decision
6.1b (cond./uncond. clearance) 3855 92.94
6.1c (Phase 2) 175 4.22




8.1 (clearance) 20 11.36
8.2 (cond./uncond. clearance) 114 64.77
8.3 (prohibition) 17 9.66
8.4 (prohibition) 1 0.57
withdrawn 24 13.64
TOTAL 176∗ 100.00
Note: ∗ The difference in 1 case is due to M.308 (Kali+Salz/MDK/
Treuhand) which was cleared after successfully appealing against
a Phase 2 Remedies decision.
to control for merger wave effects [Clougherty and Duso, 2009]. To this, data on
the industries each merger belongs to were matched as well (see under Control
Variables). As mentioned, the dataset I create is not panel or time series in
nature. The dataset consists of a selection of cases from the combined datasets
which could be identified as anticompetitive or not with the result that the sample
is a repeated cross-section where each time period t contains a different selection
of non-anticompetitive and anticompetitive mergers i with merger-, time- and
industry-specific variables [Cameron and Trivedi, 2005]. Similar to true panel
data and in view of the time/industry dimension of some variables, I will therefore
control for time- or industry-specific effects by using time trend variables and
industry-specific dummies.
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3.4.2 Control Variables
I have created industry-level variables, aggregated on the NACE level, and matched
them against the merger cases, using the common NACE codes and the relevant
year of notification. Market characteristics and financial conditions have an in-
fluence on the merging behaviour of firms [Harford, 2005]. From the Thomson
Reuters Worldscope and Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum databases, I aggre-
gate the firm-level balance sheet and profit&loss data variables31 to construct
NACE-level variables Salesgrowthit, Sharereturnit, Tobinsqit, MarkettoBookit.
The control variables are identical with the control variables constructed in
Clougherty et al. [2013b] and are described in more detail in Table 3.3.32
The control variables further contain indicators for the competition intensity
in the industries: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHIit), which is a widely ap-
plied competition index but, as Griffith et al. [2005] point out, not always indica-
tive of the real intensity of competition, as it ignores the output reallocation effect
to more efficient firms. I therefore also use a competition indicator developed by
Boone [2008] and applied by Griffith et al. [2005], the relative-profits measure
(Betait). It measures the semi-elasticity of a firm’s variable profits against its
variable costs and accounts for the fact that more efficient firms have higher
price-cost margins and higher profits and that in a competitive industry, ineffi-
cient firms are punished more severely in terms of profits. Empirically, as Griffth
et al. show, the relative profits measure is captured by estimating the equation
ln πj = α + β(cj/pj) + εj for each firm j belonging to the same industry and its
estimated coefficient βj as an indicator of how much inefficient firms are pun-
31 Of all firms belonging to Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Channel Islands, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechten-
stein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom.
32 As in Clougherty et al. [2013b], the Worldscope/SDC variables which are categorised by
SIC codes had to be allocated to the European mergers’ NACE codes by a self-generated
SIC/NAICS/NACE conversion key. The conversion was made in such way that many SICs
could point to one NACE, but not to several NACEs at the same time (SIC:NACE=m:1).
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ished with lower relative profits.33 A more negative Betait thus indicates higher
competition and relative variable profits.
As a final step, the control variables were then allocated to the identified merg-
ers by industry and year. I used control variables which were lagged one year
compared to the year of the merger case.
With a view to Clougherty et al. [2013a], I made an attempt in constructing
acquirer- or target-specific variables or variables pointing out differences between
the two out of the sample. Due to missing data and the fact that not all firms
could be identified as acquirer or target, the majority of observations would be
lost in the subsequent estimation (more than 80%). Reducing the sample to
the observations where acquirer and/or target were identified did not change the
results significantly; using other acquirer/target characteristics constructed from
another database might be a worthwhile addition in the future.
Table 3.3 describes in detail the variables used for the estimation. Table 3.4
reports the preliminary statistics for the sample. We have approximately 270
notifications on average per year, with Phase 1 Remedies being the most taken
decision (12 per year). The average number of Preventions (i.e., prohibitions
and Phase 2 Withdrawals) is 2.8 per year with 8 being the maximum. I was
able to identify 1773 of the 2574 mergers in terms of anticompetitiveness. The
majority of mergers can be classified as non-anticompetitive. The acquirer has
on average been involved in 5 previous merger cases, while the target’s case
experience amounts on average to 2 cases.
The regressions will mainly focus on the coefficients of the Policy variables and
the marginal effects respectively, and whether or not the corresponding signs will
be negative and significant. As mentioned above, the Commission’s merger policy
will have an impact on the firms’ decision whether to file for an anticompetitive
merger and thus on the firms’ expectations on how the Commission will decide
given a specific merger. It could be expected that the sign for Prohibitions is
33 The above equation represents the semielasticity of absolute costs against relative profits.
Using ln(cj/pj) would give us the elasticity.
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negative, meaning that the Commission’s decision to ban a merger would have a
negative impact on the likelihood of notifying an anticompetitive merger. Duso
et al. [2013] suppose that Phase 2 Withdrawals might have similar impacts as
prohibitions so that I expect preventions which combines prohibitions and Phase
2 Withdrawals to be overall negative. It is likely that a Policy variable aggregating
all actions taken by the Commission other than Clearance might have a deterrent
influence as well. As for the other Policy variables, the impact could be less
obvious. Clougherty et al. [2013b] find that Phase 1 Remedies might have a
negative impact. Phase 2 Remedies should constitute a more aggravating factor
for potential merging firms, since proceedings will become much more lengthy
and costly. As for preventions in the past year of the same industry, a negative
impact should be expected.
Table 3.3: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition Variable
Group




ExperienceAcqit Number of cases firm 1 of merger i has been in up
to the current case at time t
Mi,t
(Merger
ExperienceTarit Number of cases firm 2 of merger i has been in up
to the current case at time t
variables)
PastYIndprevit Sum of preventions (Prohibitions and Phase 2
Withdrawals) in the merger i’s industry in the past
year of time t
Ni,t−1 Lagged sum of Notifications for merger i Pi,t−1
R1i,t−1 Lagged sum of Phase 1 Remedies for merger i (Policy
W1i,t−1 Lagged sum of Phase 1 Withdrawals for merger i variables)
R2i,t−1 Lagged sum of Phase 2 Remedies for merger i
Si,t−1 Lagged sum of Simplified Procedures for merger i
Pi,t−1 Lagged sum of Preventions (Prohibitions and Phase






Ai,t−1 Lagged sum of Phase 1 Remedies, Phase 2 Reme-




Salesgrowthit Average sales growth at time t over a 2 years period
in merger i’s industry [Andrade and Stafford, 2004]:
Ii,t
(Industry
(avsalesi − 2L.avsalesi)/2L.avsalesi variables)
Sharereturnit Average market capitalisation in merger i’s indus-
try at time t:
(avmarketcapi − L.avmarketcapi)/L.avmarketcapi






MarkettoBookit Mean market-to-book ratio in merger i’s industry






HHIit Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in merger i’s industry







Betait As in Griffith et al. [2005], this measure of com-
petitiveness is captured by the coefficients, Betait,
which are the coefficient estimates from an OLS re-
gression of variable profits on average costs for all
firms within merger i’s industry at time t:









Variable profits are defined as πjt ≈ salesjt−cost of







Notes: Some Worldscope variables are reported in the local currencies of the re-
spective home country, which were converted into US$. All variables (except the
HHI and the Beta) are price-adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index of
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Policy and action variables are either lagged
by year or by quarter. Industry variables either cover the last year (starting with
1y ...) or the second to last year (starting with 2y ...) before the time of merger i.
Table 3.4: Preliminary Statistics of Estimation Sample
Count Mean Sd Min Max
Notifications/year 1773 269.8539 88.40383 50 394
Ph1 Remedies/year 1773 12.4749 6.221555 0 25
Ph2 Remedies/year 1773 5.454597 2.299229 0 10
Ph1 Withdrawals/year 1773 4.988156 3.351388 0 23
Preventions/year 1773 2.777778 2.903882 0 8
Simplifieds/year 1773 108.2504 83.93919 0 237
Actions/year 1773 27.44783 12.26288 5 55
Notifications/quarter 1764 69.089 25.49282 10 135
Ph1 Remedies/quarter 1764 3.223923 2.394045 0 10
Ph2 Remedies/quarter 1764 1.378118 1.151289 0 4
Ph1 Withdrawals/quarter 1764 1.242063 1.194533 0 4
Preventions/quarter 1764 0.7040816 0.9783622 0 3
Simplifieds/quarter 1764 27.78912 22.60115 0 76
Actions/quarter 1764 6.997166 3.808891 0 19
Industry Preventions 1773 0.0806543 0.3055787 0 2
Anticompetitive (dummy) 1773 0.0642978 0.2453519 0 1
Experience Acq. 1773 4.472645 5.299278 1 51
Experience Tar. 1773 1.554992 1.347577 1 19
HHI 1773 0.1076911 0.1073669 0.0134254 0.7506976
Boone Beta 1773 −2.330902 3.254902 −31.18965 17.89905
Salesgrowth 1773 0.092346 0.1579531 −0.6829271 1.519308
MarkettoBook 1773 3.27254 29.12174 0.3258478 853.0021
Tobinsq (log) 1773 0.5156815 0.7902815 −4.049794 6.748981





The results in Appendix B, Table B.1 and Table B.2 report marginal effects of the
logit estimations. First off, the results are to some extent similar when the Policy
variables were lagged by years, half years, or quarters. Only the results when
years or quarters were used are reported for comparison’s sake. The year results
show more informative and significant results than the quarter results. This
would make sense since it takes some time for the firms to react to a decision,
be it for analysing the merger decision or for preparing a merger notification
thereafter. It is conceivable in any case that a yearly lag seems to be more
realistic than a quarterly lag. I have used five different specifications, integrating
the Action or Policy variables in five different variations: the first one uses only
the control variables Merger variables and Industry variables, the second includes
the aggregated Action variable along with Industry Preventions, the third further
includes individual Policy variables of 2 lags, the fourth Policy variables of 1 lag,
while the fifth uses only the Merger and Policy variables of 2 lags with no Industry
variables.
Based on the year results, Phase 2 Remedies of last year and preventions of
the last 2 years have a significant effect on the probability that a notified merger
is anticompetitive at the 5% level. Both Preventions and Phase 2 Remedies have
a negative sign, as expected. Firms will see Phase 2 Remedies as an unwelcome
hurdle to having their mergers cleared. They will anticipate extended and more
costly proceedings along with the fear that the conditions which the Commission
imposes might be unduly restrictive.34
While preventions showed negative significance for notifications of anticompeti-
tive mergers, Industry Preventions have negative signs without being significant.35
34 In the regressions with variables lagged by quarter, Phase 2 Remedies are not significant
but (at least with 2 lags) show a negative sign, whereas preventions with 2 lags are weakly
significant in their deterrent effect and show negative signs throughout all specifications.
35 Industry Preventions further show a weak deterrent effect in the logit estimation by quarter
lags, where they are deterrent at the 10% level.
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Phase 1 Remedies show a weakly significant negative effect with 1 year lags
and negative signs with 2 year lags. This seems to indicate that already remedies
decision in an early stage of the merger process could have a deterrent effect on the
future filing of anticompetitive mergers, similar to Phase 2 Remedies. Although
Phase 1 Remedies do not entail proceedings as extended as Phase 2 Remedies
and it rather means that the merger will be cleared, firms might be afraid of too
many concessions they need to make in order to obtain clearance.36
Phase 1 Withdrawals seem to have a positive effect, especially when lagged
by 2 years; a possible explanation is that they are being received as a positive
signal to the firms, since they see that controversial or potentially problematic
mergers can be aborted at a comparatively early stage upon notification which
makes filing less risky. The overall effect of Phase 1 Withdrawals remains a bit
unclear, nevertheless. When lagged by 1 year, Phase 1 Withdrawals show a nega-
tive effect, while lagging them by 2 years makes them positively significant. With
respect to decisions which were taken in a simplified procedure, one would ex-
pect an encouraging effect on the propensity to file for anticompetitive mergers.
However, the results point towards simplified decisions lagged by 1 year having
a significantly negative impact. The effect is lost when lagged by 2 years. One
possible explanation could be that firms, when contemplating to notify an an-
ticompetitive merger, do not expect the merger to run through the simplified
procedure in the first case. It is a well-known fact that only mergers which are
evidently unproblematic are channeled through the simplified procedure.
Overall, some of the Policy variables show impacts as expected. Decisions
entailing a negative or at least prolonged outcome such as Preventions, Industry
Preventions, and Phase 2 Remedies show significantly negative or negative signs
towards the probability of notifying an anticompetitive merger, so do Phase 1
Remedies, while the effect of Phase 1 Withdrawals and Simplified Decisions is
not clear.
36 In the quarter regressions, Phase 1 Remedies have negative signs when lagged by 1 quarter.
70
3.5 Results
The results also reveal that past merger experience of the acquirer firm appears
to have a positive impact on the decision to notify an anticompetitive merger.
In almost all specifications and time periods, merger experience shows a positive
significant effect, at least at the 10%-level.
I tested the null hypothesis whether the linear combination of the coefficients
pertaining to the two lags of each Policy variable or Action variable amounted
to zero.37 The results are shown in Table 3.5. The null hypothesis cannot be
rejected with respect to the coefficients of the lags for almost all Policy variables,
except Ph1 Withdrawals where the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5%
level. The linear combinations for Ph2 Remedies and Preventions (both on a per
year basis) should be slightly negative.
Table 3.5: Test Results – Linear Combinations of Coefficients for Lags 1 and 2
Coeff. Se z P > |z| 95% Conf. interval
Ph1 Remedies/year 0.0196 0.0822 0.24 0.812 −0.1415 0.1807
Ph2 Remedies/year −0.2390 0.1509 −1.58 0.113 −0.5347 0.0568
Ph1 Withdrawals/year 0.1680 0.0853 1.97 0.049 0.0009 0.3351
Preventions/year −0.2455 0.1268 −1.94 0.053 −0.4940 0.0030
Simplifieds/year −0.0100 0.0100 −1.00 0.317 −0.0295 0.0095
Actions/year −0.0133 0.0129 −1.03 0.303 −0.0385 0.0120
Ph1 Remedies/quarter −0.0451 0.0637 −0.71 0.479 −0.1700 0.0798
Ph2 Remedies/quarter 0.0267 0.1168 0.23 0.819 −0.2021 0.2556
Ph1 Withdrawals/quarter 0.0680 0.1117 0.61 0.542 −0.1508 0.2869
Preventions/quarter −0.1285 0.0993 −1.29 0.196 −0.3232 0.0662
Simplifieds/quarter −0.0136 0.0087 −1.56 0.119 −0.0307 0.0034
Actions/quarter −0.0055 0.0318 0.17 0.863 −0.0568 0.0677
37 This test was carried out with the STATA lincom command.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper marks a first step in the direction of a comprehensive measurement of
deterrent effects. Constituting the measurement of effects related to past policy
actions on the propensity to notify anticompetitive mergers, it would methodically
precede the estimation of decision probabilities of the authority which would then
ultimately be used to estimate the firms’ decision probability to merge or not to
merge. As discussed above, this paper does not correct for the fact that only the
data of mergers actually filed is used.
Nevertheless, the results of the first step already show some indication of the
individual effects some decisions have: Phase 2 decisions such as prohibitions,
withdrawals or remedies show a deterrent effect on the notification of anticom-
petitive mergers, while the effect is less clear with Phase 1 decisions other than
remedies. Therefore, the instruments in Phase 2 of the Commission seem to work
well in principle.
From a policy perspective, however, it might be desirable to increase the ef-
fectiveness of Phase 1 decisions and communication during Phase 1. On the
one hand, this would reduce the number of costly, resource-intensive and lengthy
Phase 2 decisions as firms might increasingly refrain from filing potentially prob-
lematic mergers or promptly withdraw before Phase 2. If the quality of Phase 1
scanning were improved so as to identify hopeless cases more readily, less deci-
sions will actually enter Phase 2; at the same time, however, as discussed in the
results above, firms might not necessarily be deterred to file an anticompetitive
merger in the first place, as the fact that they could comparatively quickly and
easily withdraw a merger in Phase 1 if resistance were felt might reduce the cost
and time risk attached to a filing. While improvement of Phase 1 scanning could
thus encourage firms to file for anticompetitive mergers, at the same time the
question needs to be asked if the initiation of Phase 2 proceedings per se has a
deterrent effect on the firms. Logit regressions using a variable aggregating all
Phase 2 actions only show no or a very weak negative significant effect, similar to
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the Actions variable which has been used to aggregate all Phase 1 and 2 actions.
This could suggest that Phase 2 actions as such do not deter; rather it must be
the individual decisions in Phase 2 sending certain signals to the firms’ merging
behaviour. Phase 1 Withdrawals might have a slightly encouraging effect in the
short term as can be seen in the quarterly results; however, that does not imply
that Phase 1 scanning shall not be improved, since the effect of Phase 2 actions
as such is negligible as just mentioned. Considering the fact that any Phase 2
proceeding ties up personnel and other resources for a period of many months, the
potential for savings is enormous by simply reducing the need to initiate Phase 2.
Ideally, this might lead to Phase 2 actions per se having a significant deterrent ef-
fect, overriding any encouraging effect the possibility to withdraw the notification
early might have. Once the Phase 1 scanning system works perfectly, a poten-
tial increase of anticompetitive notifications encouraged by Phase 1 Withdrawals
would be manageable given the quality of the scanning; on the contrary, it may
then be expected that Phase 1 scanning will take over as a sufficient deterrent
device for the firms without further involving Phase 2 instruments.
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4 Competitors in Merger
Control: Shall they be Merely
Heard or also Listened To?
This chapter is based on Giebe and Lee [2014].
4.1 Introduction
Both in the European Union (EU) and the U.S., competitors have gained sig-
nificance in merger control proceedings. EU merger law presently entitles com-
petitors to submit their views on the notified merger in writing and in a formal
hearing before the European Commission (Commission) makes a final decision.
Additionally, competitors have been increasingly involved in the Commission’s
fact-finding and market investigation process. In the U.S., competitors’ claims
were traditionally treated restrictively but both the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission have recently started to widen the extent of com-
petitor participation in merger proceedings by conducting an ‘open door’ policy.
These recent procedural developments in merger control have motivated us to
explore potential policy deficiencies which might arise out of a conflict between
legal due process and economic efficiency aspects: while, on the one hand, we have
regulatory, procedural, and practical reasons to take into account the competitors’
opinions such as their legal right to be heard or the authority’s past heavy reliance
on third-party input resulting from its information deficit due to limited resources;
on the other hand, from an efficiency standpoint, there is reason to believe that a
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certain degree of temptation exists on the part of the competitors to manipulate
the authority so as to achieve a decision maximising their own profits rather than
total welfare.
Our goal in this paper will be to present in a tractable game-theoretic model to
what extent the rule, or best practice, depending on the jurisdiction, of hearing
competitors’ opinions can be used and abused. Relevant literature is mentioned
throughout the paper. Section 4.2 will discuss the legal background and the
procedural aspects of hearing competitors’ views; Section 4.3 will describe the
model setup and the game; Section 4.4 will provide interpretation and policy
recommendations based on the results of the game. Appendix C, will contain all
lemmas and proofs, and empirical data on EU merger cases.
4.2 Competitor Involvement in Merger Control
4.2.1 European Union
Competitor involvement in EU merger control is explicitly set forth in the Eu-
ropean merger law provisions: Within 7–10 days after receiving a merger noti-
fication the Commission sends out Article 111 letters to the filing parties and
‘interested third parties.’ The law defines the latter usually as being competitors,
suppliers, and customers.2 The so-called Article 11 letters’ main purpose is to
gather information on the market in Phase 1. The Best Practice Guidelines fur-
ther set forth that the Commission may consult third parties on methodological
issues regarding data and information gathering in the relevant economic sector.3
Third parties showing sufficient interest may request in Phase 1 to be heard orally.
In Phase 2, the Commission sends to the involved third parties a nonconfidential
version of the Statement of Objections4 after which the third parties have the right
1 Merger Regulation 139/2004.
2 Art. 11(c) of the Regulation 802/2004 (Implementing Regulation) implementing the Merger
Regulation 139/2004, i.e., setting forth details on notifications, time limits, and hearings.
3 Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings 2004, para. 28.
4 Art. 16(1) Implementing Regulation.
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to express their view in writing or orally in a formal hearing.5
Finally, the Commission states in its Best Practice Guidelines that it wel-
comes any individual submission apart from direct replies from questionnaires
where third parties provide ‘information and comments’ considered relevant for
the merger assessment. It may also invite those parties for meetings to discuss
or clarify such issues further.6
The prevailing view among scholars and practitioners is that in most cases, the
Commission will lack the internal market expertise upon receiving a notification,
thereby granting a ‘considerable scope’ of comment to and relying heavily on
the information provided by the third parties.7 Hearing Officers Durande and
Williams of the Cabinet of the Commissioner agree that although the right for a
formal hearing may in principle be denied by the Commission, the rights of the
‘other involved third parties’ which includes competitors must be considered as
being much closer to those of a defendant in terms of procedural guarantees.8
4.2.2 U.S.
The U.S. has been traditionally more reserved in granting rights to competitors in
merger proceedings. The responsible authorities, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), took the view that competitors
were more likely to complain about mergers which would render the market more
competitive post merger.9 To competitors who tried to challenge a merger by
way of an injunction10 or sue for damages, the Supreme Court usually denied
standing to the competitors.11
5 Art. 16 and 18 Implementing Regulation.
6 Para. 35.
7 Bellis [2005, p. 861]; Hamilton [2004, p. 4].
8 As compared to rights of a complainant in antitrust matters. See Durande and Williams
[2005, p. 22].
9 Diesenhaus [1987, p. 2059]; Van Arsdall and Piehl [2014].
10 Sec. 16 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
11 Cargill v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 484 (1986).
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However, while the DoJ and FTC were once resistant to hear competitors in
pending merger proceedings, the practice has markedly changed in the recent
years. The most prominent case was AT&T Inc.’s contemplated acquisition of
T-Mobile USA, Inc. in 2011.12 Competitors Sprint Nextel and Cellular South
opposed the merger and the agencies supported their efforts in gaining access to
the documents relating to the merger.13 After their strong objections which were
also supported by the U.S. and several states, AT&T ultimately abandoned its
efforts to acquire T-Mobile USA.
Given the recent shift in the agencies’ stance towards competitors, practition-
ers in the U.S. have become conscious about the ‘right strategy’ competitors
could take in merger proceedings, stating that the bigger role in merger review
‘necessitates an additional layer of planning and strategy.’14
4.2.3 Legal and Strategic Considerations in Competitor
Involvement
Apart from information-gathering purposes, the involvement of competitors as set
forth by EU laws is partly motivated by the legal principle of granting anyone the
right to be heard before an individual measure which would affect such person
adversely is taken15 and partly by due process considerations. Legislators and
legal scholars might have taken a naive view upon drafting the rules that the
competitors would always report truthfully to the deciding agency. A competitor
raising serious doubts about a merger would thus be a reason to view the merger
more critically.
While the competitors’ right to be heard can be seen as a softer version of
the usual rights of defence,16 practice shows that their participation is crucial if
12 AT&T Inc., Description of Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstra-
tions, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 1, FCC filed April 21, 2011.
13 See detailed case discussion in Hundt [2011]; Stucke and Grunes [2012, p. 196].
14 Van Arsdall and Piehl [2014, p. 2].
15 Art. 41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
16 Durande and Williams [2005, p. 23].
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not essential in merger proceedings, as their involvement in Phase 2 proceedings
shows:
We have looked into all Phase 2 proceedings between 1990 and 2013 and iden-
tified those cases where competitors were given the opportunity to voice their
opinions.17 As can be seen in Figure 4.1 which plots the ratio between competitor
participation and Phase 2 cases, competitor involvement has radically increased
since the reform and the ratio has stayed continuously at 1. One can assume
presently that all Phase 2 proceedings will entail the involvement of competitors,
whereas in the past, that was not necessarily the case.
We have further plotted the ratio of competitor objections to only those Phase 2
cases where competitors have been involved for the years from 1997 until 2013, see
Figure 4.2. In other words, only those instances were captured where competitors
had a negative opinion on the merger proposed. As can be seen, competitors
have been increasingly voicing concerns in the past years. Could it be because
competitors have realised the strategic potential in merger proceedings or because
more competition-enhancing mergers have been notified in the past years which
17 See Section C.3 for additional empirical data.
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did not find the competitors’ approval?
In any case, scholars and practitioners now agree that competitors’ opinions
in merger proceedings shall be viewed with skepticism (see, e.g., Motta, 2004,
p. 240). The Commission has recently proceeded to add in its decisions a foot-
note saying that information furnished by third parties will not be taken at face
value since ‘the opinion provided might be biased to influence [its] decision-making
process.’ The footnote further states that the Commission will thus analyse com-
petitors’ opinions very carefully as they ‘might have an interest in making the
transaction of their competitors [...] more difficult.’18
The FTC stated already 25 years ago in an amicus brief that competitors ‘stand
to benefit from, and have no incentive to challenge, acquisitions that may lead
to supracompetitive pricing. [They] have a substantial incentive to challenge ac-
quisitions that will make their rivals more efficient, make their industry more
competitive, and reduce the prices they can charge their customers. [...] [Com-
18 See, for example, the decision in Ryanair/Aer Lingus III, M.6663, Feb. 27, 2013, para. 28,
footnote 18.
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petitors must be] prevented from using the antitrust laws for anticompetitive
purposes.’19
At the same time, the authorities are by definition market outsiders and must
to some extent rely on the information provided by market insiders. They further
face time and cost constraints which make it even more difficult to assess the state
of a market or to anticipate the implication of a proposed merger on the market.
Once competitors are playing a role in the market assessment, however, there is a
potential risk for strategic abuse of the legal possibility to express their opinions
by sending distorted signals to the authorities in order to promote their own
interests.
From an economic standpoint, this creates ample room for efficiency losses post
merger:
It is possible that a merger creates efficiency gains for the merged company.
Unit cost savings lead to lower prices offsetting a market power gain. As a result,
the competitors’ profits decrease when a merger has sufficiently large efficiency
gains and thus a positive effect on welfare. In such case, it is profit-maximising for
the competitors to object to the merger, since its interests are in conflict with the
authority’s goal of maximising welfare and the merging parties’ merger proposal.
Hence, competitors will have a strong incentive to complain when the merger is
likely to decrease prices.20
It is further possible that a merger merely increases market power without
creating large enough efficiencies. There is ample literature showing that such a
merger in an oligopolistic market benefits the competitors more than the merging
firms, both in Bertrand and Cournot markets. In a Bertrand market, both merg-
ing and non-merging firms will have an interest in a merger since both will profit
from increased prices, while in a Cournot market, the non-merging firms will free
ride on the output reduction of the merging firms, leading to higher profits and
19 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae, Cargill v.
Monfort.
20 Motta [2004, p. 240].
81
4 Competitors in Merger Control: Shall they be Merely Heard or also Listened To?
even losses to the merging firms.21 In the case of such a merger, competitors will
have a strong incentive to convince the authority that the merger be cleared.
The aforementioned cases are mere examples where the interests of the author-
ity and the competitor are not aligned and hence great care needs to be exercised
in considering the information provided by the competitors. Further conceivable
types of mergers shall be discussed in the next section. The examples already
give an indication of the competitors’ great potential to use its role in merger
proceedings purely strategically, rather than truthfully.
Our paper is the first to set up a formal game-theoretical model for the strategic
interactions between competitor and authority in merger proceedings.22 We have
found the signaling game setup a particularly fitting model since it best captures
the procedural and informational features of merger review.23 It is safe to assume
that the authority faces incomplete information on the merger proposed, while
the competitor, as a market insider, is in a position to send informative signals
to the decisionmaker. We further assume that the competitor before making its
statement has an idea of the authority’s prior information, through press releases,
communication with the authority, and, especially in the EU, the Statement of
Objections. The goal of this paper shall be to outline the full extent of abuse so
that authorities and policymakers get a toolkit about how to distinguish between
cases where competitors may be heard, but should not be listened to, whereas in
other instances, competitors should be heard and listened to as well.
21 Theoretically, firms would thus typically never merge in a Cournot market. Managerial
misjudgement could still be a reason why mergers in Cournot markets could still take place.
Salant et al. [1983, p. 195]; Sørgard [2009, p. 444, footnote 12]; Duso et al. [2011, p. 985];
Bester [2007, p. 153].
22 Lagerlöf and Heidhues [2005] derive optimal merger control institutions in order to induce
merger insiders to invest into the production of hard evidence about efficiency gains. They
assume that a merger is always profitable for the insiders. Milgrom and Roberts [1986]
discuss on a general level the problem of a decisionmaker who has to rely on the information
of (and competition between) better informed parties. Any information revealed is assumed
to be verifiable.
23 In this first step, our goal is to examine the existing institution and its implications rather
than to set up the optimal information extraction process from involved parties in a merger
process as part of institutional or mechanism design.
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4.3 Model and Analysis
In this section, we shall motivate our model before introducing it formally. Our
model sets out to capture the characteristic interaction between the competitor(s)
and the competition authority. In particular, we need to take into account the
information which is available to each side, including the fact that there might
be common and diverging interests on the kind of decision the authority will take
in a merger case. Our game starts after a merger has been notified. We do not
include the merging firms as strategic players in the model as we assume that
they always have an interest in getting the merger cleared. Any signals they
might send to the authority will be unequivocally positive towards the merger.
The merging firms’ competitors, on the other hand, will have an incentive to
send truthful signals or distorted signals, depending on their own profit effects of
the merger. In some cases, their own positive profit effects might go along with
positive welfare effects or their negative profit effects with negative welfare effects,
thus aligning both sides’ interests towards a specific decision. As a consequence,
the question when and under which conditions the competitor’s signals should be
taken at face value arises more imminently and in two more dimensions than in
the analysis of an interaction between merging firms and the authority.
In the next subsection, we will describe the merger types which we will use in
our analysis. We assume that the competitor knows the type of the currently no-
tified merger. This gives credit to the fact that the competitor as market insider
is typically better informed than the authority concerning the likely consequences
of a cleared merger. The authority is supposed to have common-knowledge in-
formation derived from its own information-gathering efforts.24
Thus, in terms of timing we assume that a merger of a given type is first
notified. The competitor then observes such type and conveys a message to the
authority. We further assume that the competitor will show a clear preference
24 As mentioned before, this information is assumed to be available to the competitor, e.g.,
through the Statement of Objections.
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towards prohibition or clearance so that only two messages are possible, i.e., a
recommendation to clear or to prohibit a notified merger. After observing the
message, the authority takes either a clearance or prohibition decision.25 Our
analysis derives the pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria of this signaling game
and derives policy recommendations.
4.3.1 Merger Types
The starting point of our model is the fact that mergers have implications on the
merging firms’ profits (πM), competitor’s profits (πC), and on welfare (W ), as
measured by the welfare standard applied. We shall neglect the merging firms’
decision in our model in the sense that merging firms will not strategically interact
with competitors or the authority in this game. We then assume that the author-
ities posit a welfare standard for their merger decisions and that competitor firms
operate as profit maximisers. For our analysis, it does not matter whether the
authority, say, applies a total or a consumer welfare standard. Denote by ∆ the
change of a given variable due to clearing a merger. Mergers then can carry all
kinds of combinations of ∆πC and ∆W and in all degrees, such as slightly positive
∆πC while having vastly negative ∆W , etc. It is therefore useful to visualise a
grid with four quadrants with ∆πC and ∆W on the axes. Mergers can then be
plotted in all four quadrants based on their implications on ∆πC and ∆W . The
origin of that grid is understood as the status quo, which prevails if the merger
is blocked by the authority.
Our analysis thus distinguishes four merger types, where, for simplicity we
restrict to ∆πC , ∆W ∈ {−1, 1}, modeling the direction in which a clearance
decision would alter welfare and the competitor’s profit. This is, naturally, a very
simplifying assumption, but it allows us to keep the analysis straightforward and
get clear results while still tackling the relevant strategic issues. Apart from that,
it might already be a challenging task in practice to place a given merger correctly
25 For the sake of simplifying the model, we leave out the option of a clearance decision with
remedies, either in Phase 1 or Phase 2.
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within our four-quadrant model. From a policy perspective, it might also not be
practicable to analyse a more general model where ∆πC and ∆W are distributed
on a finer grid, as this would require the authority to attach probabilities to each
of the many types.
This taxonomy of merger types has the advantage that it is complete as it
covers all conceivable types, independent of their practical relevance. Moreover,
it allows us to distinguish types based on the two sides’ (the competitor’s and the
authority’s) preferences, which might be aligned or not. The practical relevance of
each merger type is captured by the authority’s prior information which attaches
a probability to each conceivable type.
In this context, it may be illustrative to draw upon the taxonomy of mergers,
proposed by Clougherty and Duso [2011, p. 314]. They use the general IO frame-
work to distinguish between four different types of mergers, depending on the
merging firms’ post-merger profits (πM) and the competitors’ post-merger profits
(πC):
Table 4.1: Merger Taxonomy
∆πM > 0 ∆πM < 0
∆πC > 0 collusion-based synergistic nonsynergistic
∆πC < 0 efficiency-based synergistic value-destroying
The taxonomy cannot be applied directly to our purposes since, as just men-
tioned, we regard πC and W (instead of πM). In the case of collusion-based
synergistic mergers, the increase in market power absent efficiency gains leads to
higher prices and profits both with the merging firms and the competitors. Con-
sumers get hurt by the raised prices so that consumer surplus will fall. It may
be expected that total welfare also falls as a result. Efficiency-based synergistic
mergers enable the merging firms to decrease their prices due to efficiency gains
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which hurts the competitors’ profits.26 Consumers will benefit from lower prices
and we can expect total welfare to rise as a result.
If ∆πM < 0, Clougherty and Duso [2011] speak of value-decreasing or unprof-
itable mergers. Their explanation for these mergers can hardly be found in IO
theory, since firms would not merge if profits were negative, but rather in the
fact that managers make errors or overestimate post-merger profits. Managerial
hubris or incompetence, political reasons, empire-building are some reasons why
mergers are still notified in practice.27 Non-synergistic mergers are mergers where
the merging firms lose while the competitors gain; in most cases, these are merg-
ers where the expected synergies did not materialise and thus the merger was
unprofitable.28 Competitors could profit from a weakening of the merging firm’s
power since it creates a competitive opportunity. It is not evident what the total
welfare effects in such case would be but we can expect welfare to decrease rather
than increase, as consumers will not benefit from the competitors’ gain. Finally,
value-destroying mergers constitute such group of mergers where both merging
firms and competitors make losses. According to the literature, such mergers
entail efficiencies to the detriment of competitors but also high integration costs
for the merging firms themselves.29 Total welfare is likely to decrease.
Mergers with positive ∆πC and positive ∆W may not necessarily be intuitive
to substantiate: However, Heubeck et al. [2006, p. 38] give an example where this
might still happen, namely if the more efficient firm in a market is an outside firm
and the merging firms do not realise any cost efficiencies, but average marginal
costs in the market fall when the merging firms will reduce their output, while
the efficient competitor will raise output. In spite of rising prices, total welfare
will then rise.
The types proposed by Clougherty and Duso [2011] can be – roughly – fitted
into our grid without claiming completeness, see Figure 4.3.
26 Farrell and Shapiro [1990].
27 Clougherty and Duso [2011, p. 313] with further references.
28 Amir et al. [2009].
29 Clougherty and Duso [2011, p. 314] with further references.
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We set up a signaling game, i.e., a sequential game with players S (also referred
to as sender or competitor) and R (also referred to as receiver or authority), and
a nonstrategic player nature. The timing, actions, and information in this game
are as follows:
1. Nature draws the type ti of the merger from the set T = {t1, t2, t3, t4} with
corresponding prior probabilities p(ti) > 0 where

ti∈T p(ti) = 1.30
2. S observes ti and chooses a message mj from the set M = {mA, mB}.
We refer to S’s actions synonymously as reports or recommendations. We
assume that S can only send one of two messages, interpreted as either a
recommendation to prohibit or clear the merger.
3. R observes mj but does not observe ti, and chooses a decision dk from the
set D = {dP , dC}, i.e., the decision either prohibits or clears a merger.
4. Referring to the merger types discussed above, we assume four different
merger types with four possible combinations in competitors’ profit and
30 We assume strictly positive prior probabilities for each type in order to simplify the analysis.
This should not be a restrictive assumption as these probabilities can be arbitrarily small.
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welfare implications. While a prohibition is profit- and welfare-neutral,
since it constitutes the status quo, a clearance has profit and welfare effects
equal to either 1 or −1, depending on the type.31 Thus, payoffs UR(ti, dk)
and US(ti, dk) are realised, where
UR(ti, dk) =

Wi if dk = dC ,
0 if dk = dP ,
US(ti, dk) =

Πi if dk = dC ,
0 if dk = dP ,
(W1, W2, W3, W4) = (−1, 1, 1, −1), (Π1, Π2, Π3, Π4) = (1, 1, −1, −1).
Hence, the competitors have an incentive to send self-interested signals to the
authority for types 1 and 3, whereas they have no incentive to distort signals
for types 2 and 4. With respect to type 1, the competitors will be tempted to
recommend a clearance of the merger, whereas from a welfare standpoint the
merger should be blocked. Similarly, a type 3 merger increases efficiency and
will increase welfare, while it will hurt the competitors so that the latter will be
inclined to recommend blocking the merger.
In the following, we focus on pure strategies only. Later on, we will discuss
mixed strategies as well (the formal analysis of mixed strategies is done in Sec-
tion C.2).
A pure strategy of S is a function m(ti), ti ∈ T , a pure strategy of R is a
function d(mj), mj ∈ M . Conditional on observing message mj ∈ M , R’s belief
about the merger type is denoted by the probability distribution µ(ti|mj) ≥ 0,
ti ∈ T , with

ti∈T µ(ti|mj) = 1. Denote by TA ⊂ T , resp. TB ⊂ T , the merger
types for which S sends the message mA, resp. mB in any given equilibrium
(candidate). Thus, TA and TB together represent a partitioning of the type set.
Our equilibrium concept is pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There-
fore, in addition to the above belief system, we require that R’s decision dk ∈ D
31 In order to simplify notation, we will refer to profit Π and welfare W throughout the formal
discussion. In a strict sense, that should mean the respective changes in profit and welfare,
∆πC and ∆W , discussed previously.
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Similarly, S’s message mj ∈ M must be optimal, given the observed type ti and




Finally, for each message mj ∈ M that is played by S on the equilibrium path,
R’s beliefs on the information set corresponding to mj must follow from Bayes’s
rule and S’s strategy. Formally, for each message mj ∈ M for which there is a





An equilibrium is denoted by the players’ complete strategies and R’s belief sys-
tem.
{{m∗(t1), m∗(t2), m∗(t3), m∗(t4)}, {d∗(mA), d∗(mB)}, {µ(ti|mj) ∀ti ∈ T, mj ∈ M}}
4.3.3 Default Decision
We develop a default decision ddefault to be used as a benchmark for R’s decisions
under the different equilibria. There, ddefault is the authority’s optimal decision
under complete ignorance of S’s reports.
Without any signals by S, it is optimal for R to implement the decision that
implies a higher expected welfare, based on its priors. In particular, the notified
merger should be cleared (dC) if the merger is more likely to be welfare-improving
rather than welfare-decreasing, i.e., p(t2) + p(t3) ≥ p(t1) + p(t4), and prohibited
(dP ) otherwise.
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Therefore, the default decision is
ddefault =

dC if p(t2) + p(t3) ≥ p(t1) + p(t4),
dP otherwise.
(4.1)
The corresponding expected welfare (change) is
E[∆W |ddefault] =





The pure-strategy equilibrium candidates can conveniently be distinguished by
the size of the sets TA and TB, i.e., the number of types for which S sends the
same message. This results in three classes of equilibrium candidates which we
formally develop in Lemmas 1 to 3 in Appendix C, below.
Pure-strategy equilibrium candidates can be distinguished by S’s pure strategy
(mi, mj, mk, ml), with mi, mj, mk, ml ∈ M , where the first entry is the message
sent if the merger type is t1, the second for merger type t2, etc. Therefore, there
are 16 possible pure-strategy equilibrium candidates.
As there are only two different messages, mA and mB, the informational con-
tent of each pure strategy of S corresponds to a partitioning of the type set in
two subsets, e.g., the pure strategy (mA, mB, mA, mA) partitions the type set into
TA ∈ {t1, t3, t4} and TB = {t2}. Therefore, the merger type 2 is fully revealed in
this equilibrium candidate, whereas the other three types are bunched together.
As a consequence, the pure strategy (mA, mB, mA, mA) has the same informa-
tional content as (mB, mA, mB, mB) and will implement the same equilibrium
decision. For further analysis, therefore, it suffices to distinguish only half of the
16 candidates, i.e., eight pure strategies of S (Table 4.2). In Appendix C, we will
formally solve for all equilibria in Lemmas 1 to 3 by denoting the messages with
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Table 4.2: Pure-Strategy Equilibrium Candidates, mx, my ∈ M , mx ̸= my
No. Candidate Interpretation Lemma
1 {mx, mx, mx, mx} uninformative (babbling) 1
2 {my, mx, mx, mx} fully reveals type 1 2
3 {mx, my, mx, mx} fully reveals type 2 2
4 {mx, mx, my, mx} fully reveals type 3 2
5 {mx, mx, mx, my} fully reveals type 4 2
6 {mx, mx, my, my} reveals profit maximising types (1+2) 3
7 {mx, my, my, mx} reveals welfare maximising types (2+3) 3
8 {mx, my, mx, my} reveals common interest (2+4) 3
mx and my, mx, my ∈ M , mx ̸= my. The middle column in Table 4.2 gives an
interpretation of each equilibrium candidate.
The above leads to a simple structure of the equilibria candidates. We describe
and explain our findings in the following, while Appendix C, contains the for-
mal proofs. Apart from the babbling equilibria, the basic intuition is as follows:
To make use of the competitor’s message, the authority takes a specific decision
after observing mx or my, while taking the opposite decision conditional on ob-
serving the other message my or mx.32 But given such reaction on the part of
the authority, the competitor has a clear incentive to send the wrong message,
which means that it has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium candidate
strategy, whenever a truthful report implements a decision that is not in line with
the competitor’s preferences. The reason is that, first, sending the other message
will change the decision, and, second, for any given decision, there is generally
a merger type for which the competitor does not like the decision. The only
exception is the equilibrium candidate (no. 6 in Table 4.2) where the competitor
sends a purely selfish message in the sense that it reveals whether or not the
merger increases the competitor’s profit and the authority implements the com-
petitor’s preferred decision. In this candidate, the competitor obviously never
32 Clearly, the only alternative to this is ignoring the messages, i.e., taking a message-
independent decision.
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has an incentive do deceive the authority.
Uninformative Equilibrium
First, there is the uninformative or babbling equilibrium (no. 1 in Table 4.2),
i.e., S always sends the same message independent of the type which thus has no
informational content, and R decides independent of S’s message and takes the
default decision (see section 4.3.3). The decision is thus made according to the
prior beliefs the authority has over the probabilities of each merger type. R thus
clears the merger if the expected welfare based on the prior beliefs is positive
(and prohibits if negative). A requirement for this equilibrium is that R also
takes the default decision after observing an off-equilibrium message. For this,
it is sufficient but not necessary that the authority applies the prior beliefs off
the equilibrium path. What matters is that R implements the default decision
whenever S has a potential incentive to deviate to the off-equilibrium message.
One-Type Revealing
Suppose that S sends one of the messages for one type and the other message for
all other types (no. 2–5 in Table 4.2). Therefore, S reveals one of the types truth-
fully while the other three cannot be distinguished by the message. Obviously, in
case of that single revealed type, R has a unique optimal decision as it learns the
true type of the merger. This optimal decision must necessarily be implemented
in any equilibrium.
In principle, the authority has two options. First, R might ignore the messages
and implement the default. This is indeed the best response and constitutes an
equilibrium for certain constellations of R’s prior information. More precisely, as
mentioned above, R must always implement the optimal decision for the single
revealed type. Therefore, ignoring S’s message can only be an equilibrium if
R’s optimal decision is the same for that single type and for the group of three
mergers represented by the other message. If, however, the optimal decisions
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corresponding to the two messages are different, then there is no equilibrium
where the authority ignores S’s message.
Second, the authority might block the merger after one of the messages and
clear it after observing the other message. Then S can manipulate the decision
whenever this increases S’s profit. As three of the types carry the same message
and therefore the same decision, for one of those three types S must have an
incentive to deceive the authority. This is because, intuitively, for every decision
of the authority, there are exactly two types for which S likes the decision, whereas
for the other types, S prefers the opposite decision. Thus, no equilibrium exists
in which R’s decision is conditional on S’s message.
Selfish
Suppose that S sends the same message for those types of mergers where its payoff
is positive and a different message for those types where, in the case of clearance,
its payoff is negative (no. 6 in Table 4.2). Therefore, S would reveal those types for
which it would prefer to have clearance or prohibition, respectively. There is an
equilibrium where the authority implements the competitor’s recommendation.
For the rest of the paper, we refer to this equilibrium as the selfish equilibrium.
This happens if the authority has priors in such way that it is optimal to decide
according to the competitor’s truthfully revealed preferences. There is indeed
such a constellation of priors. Moreover, as we will explain in more detail later,
the decision in this equilibrium is better for both sides than the default decision.
In addition, there is, again, an equilibrium where R ignores S’s message. This
applies when priors are such that knowing whether or not the merger is profit-
increasing or -decreasing does not affect the authority’s optimal decision.
Welfare-Revealing
Suppose that S sends the same message for those merger types where welfare is
positive (types 2 and 3) and a different message for those types where, in the case
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of clearance, welfare is negative (no. 7 in Table 4.2). Therefore, S would reveal
those types for which the authority would prefer to have clearance or prohibition.
It is evident that R’s optimal decisions would be to clear the welfare-improving
types and to block the welfare-reducing types. However, this cannot constitute
an equilibrium since the competitor would always have an incentive to deviate to
improve its payoffs.
Common Interest
Suppose that S sends the same message for those merger types where both S and
R’s interests are aligned (types 2 and 4) (no. 8 in Table 4.2), whereas the other
message is sent to indicate that S and R’s interests are not aligned for the present
merger and thus point to types 1 and 3. There is no equilibrium where R decides
conditional on S’s message. Consider, e.g., the message associated with types 1
and 3 for which S and R prefer the same decision. Even though their interests
are aligned, there is a single decision for two merger types. Whichever decision
the authority takes, there is a merger type (either 1 or 3) for which S prefers the
opposite decision and therefore S has an incentive to deceive the authority. The
only remaining equilibrium candidate is one where R ignores S’s message. This
is an equilibrium whenever, based on priors, R’s optimal decision is the same for
both groups of merger types.
4.3.5 Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
As we formally show in Section C.2, the game has a continuum of mixed-strategy
equilibria. In these equilibria, R ignores S’s messages and implements the default
decision. Therefore, intuitively, S is indifferent between all pure and mixed strate-
gies. These equilibria are the ‘natural extension’ of the pure strategy equilibria
derived before, where R decides independent of S’s message.
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4.4 Policy Recommendation and Discussion
Having derived all equilibria, we can distinguish two different kinds of equilibria
by the implemented decision. Either the authority ignores any message sent by
the competitor and takes its default decision based on its prior beliefs or it follows
exactly the competitor’s recommendations (selfish equilibrium). An equilibrium
of the first kind always exists whereas the second kind of equilibrium requires a
certain constellation of the priors.
In order to prepare a policy recommendation, we first address the issue of
multiple equilibria. As the uninformative equilibrium always exists, it is clear
that we indeed have to deal with multiple equilibria for a given constellation of
priors. Nevertheless, we argue that, by plausibility, there is a clear solution to
our game. We prepare the argument by formally stating the payoff-superiority of
the selfish equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose the selfish equilibrium exists, i.e., (4.3) holds. In the
selfish equilibrium, the authority’s expected welfare and the competitor’s expected
profit are larger than under any other equilibrium.
Proposition 1 implies that both players prefer the selfish equilibrium to any
other (pure- or mixed-strategy) equilibrium. At the same time, all other equilib-
ria are payoff-equivalent (for all parties) to just implementing the default decision
without playing the game. Therefore, it is plausible to consider the selfish equi-
librium as the only relevant equilibrium (conditional on its existence), whereas –
whenever the selfish equilibrium does not exist – the authority can ignore the com-
petitor (and thus the question which equilibrium is being played) and straight-
forwardly implement the default. The decision when to listen to the competitor
and when to implement the default regardless of the competitor’s information is
simple, as it is completely based on the authority’s prior information.
Let us now look in detail at the implications of the selfish equilibrium where
S recommends its preferred decisions and R implements it. By Lemma 3, the
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formal condition for this equilibrium is
p(t1) ≤ p(t2), p(t3) < p(t4). (4.3)
This means that, conditional on the true merger type being either 1 or 2 (i.e.,
profit-increasing for the competitor), clearing the merger is more likely to increase
rather than decrease welfare (p(t1) ≤ p(t2)), and, conditional on the merger
being profit-decreasing (for the competitor), clearing the merger is more likely
to decrease than increase welfare (p(t3) < p(t4)). This constellation of prior
information is compatible with both dP or dC being the default decision.
Why does the authority (i.e., welfare) profit from the selfish equilibrium?
Clearly, it reveals valuable information to the authority: The competitor, through
the message, truthfully reveals a group of two merger types (either the profit-
increasing or the profit-decreasing types) in which the actual merger falls. Com-
bining this truthful information with the authority’s own prior information should
intuitively improve the quality of the authority’s decision. The price the author-
ity pays for this information is to implement the competitor’s preferred decision.
Nevertheless, the existence condition of the selfish equilibrium, (4.3), ensures that
the authority follows the competitor’s recommendation only if that increases ex-
pected welfare.
To shed more light on this, we now formally evaluate the accuracy of the
authority’s decision in the selfish equilibrium as compared to the default decision.
In the former, the authority relies on prior as well as the competitor’s revealed
information, whereas the latter is entirely based on prior information. We define:
The accuracy of the authority’s decision is the probability that the decision
is (ex post) welfare-maximising conditional on the information available to the
authority.
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Decision accuracy is therefore a value between zero and one.33 For example,
the default decision is dP if the merger is more likely to be of either type 1 or
4, rather than 2 or 3. Therefore, the accuracy of the default decision is the
probability that dP is ex post welfare-maximising. In other words, it is the
probability that the merger type is either 1 or 4, based on prior information. This
probability is (p(t1) + p(t4))/(p(t1) + p(t2) + p(t3) + p(t4)) = p(t1) + p(t4) > 1/2.
As another example, consider the selfish equilibrium and suppose the competitor
revealed that the merger type is profit-increasing, i.e., either type 1 or 2. The
authority will then follow the recommendation and implement dC . This decision
is ex post correct only if the merger is of type 2. The probability of this is
p(t2)/(p(t1) + p(t2)) ≥ 1/2, by (4.3).
Proposition 2 summarises this discussion formally. It contains the observation
that the decision accuracy improves even if the selfish equilibrium implements
the same decision as the default. Intuitively this is because the competitor’s
additional information ‘confirms’ the default decision, increasing the probability
that the decision is correct.
Proposition 2. Consider the selfish equilibrium and the default decision which
is entirely based on prior information. In the selfish equilibrium, the accuracy of
the authority’s decision is higher than under the default decision. This holds re-
gardless of whether the decision implemented in the selfish equilibrium is different
from the default decision or not.
From these results we can derive a clear policy recommendation:
• In accordance with the procedural rules or practices, the authority is free to
hear the competitor’s opinion in all merger cases, however, it should almost
never listen.
• The only case where it should not only hear but listen is when the au-
thority’s and the competitor’s interests are aligned in the following way:34
33 It would be one if the authority knew the merger type and accordingly implemented the
optimal decision.
34 Or, equivalently, when conditions (4.3) hold.
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The authority’s prior information must be such that welfare is more likely
to increase rather than decrease, conditional on clearing a profit-increasing
merger, and welfare must be more likely to decrease than increase, if a
profit-decreasing merger were cleared.
• Therefore, intuitively, the authority should first thoroughly analyse and ver-
ify its prior information which reveals if it should listen to the competitor’s
opinion or ignore it. Given the right prior constellation, the authority should
listen to the rival and straightforwardly implement its recommendation.
4.5 Conclusion
We have set up a model capturing the strategic interaction between competitor
and authority in merger proceedings. As the competitor has superior informa-
tion as well as a potential incentive to deceive the authority, it is important to
understand how the authority should deal with the competitor’s information.
Our main result is that the authority should generally ignore the competitor’s
recommendation, with one exception: If the interests of both parties are statisti-
cally aligned in a certain way, the authority should straightforwardly implement
the competitor’s recommendation. We have shown that this will improve the ac-
curacy of the authority’s decision, regardless of whether it would have taken the
same or a different decision in ignorance of the competitor’s report. Therefore,
implementing the competitor’s choice in these cases is a price worth paying.
Moreover, we have shown that the situation in which the authority should
follow the competitor’s recommendation is easily derived from the authority’s
own information: Merger type 2 must be expected to be more likely than type 1
and at the same time, type 4 must be more likely than type 3. In other words,
welfare must be expected to increase if a profit-increasing merger is cleared, and
welfare must be expected to decrease if a profit-decreasing merger were cleared.35




Our analysis implies that the authority should strengthen its efforts to im-
prove its prior information. This will save resources otherwise used for gathering




The essays in this dissertation investigate into the effectiveness of merger control
in the European Union. Chapters 2 and 3 analyse the deterrent effect of merger
policy decisions on future merger activity. Both chapters find that Phase 1 Reme-
dies have a distinct effect on deterrence; Chapter 2 finds that Phase 1 Remedies
work best in the low-competition industries which goes in line with the results in
Chapter 3 where Phase 1 Remedies seem to deter firms from filing anticompetitive
mergers. A possible explanation is that, although one could assume that Phase
1 proceedings entail less costs than Phase 2 proceedings and therefore Phase 1
Remedies might be encouraging rather than deterring, merging firms might agree
to Phase 1 Remedies at relatively big concessions. In Chapter 3, I further find that
individual Phase 2 instruments such as prohibitions, withdrawals, and remedies
also involve relatively strong deterrence on the filing of anticompetitive mergers,
whereas on an industry level the effect of Phase 2 instruments, with respect to
the total number of filed notifications, seems to be generally weaker. Both anal-
yses show that the aggregate effect of Phase 2 instruments, that is, the mere fact
that Phase 2 proceedings were initiated, was not notable; rather, selected Phase
2 decisions had strong or less strong deterrent effects. Chapter 4 shows that the
present rule of competitor involvement is suboptimal in the sense that it leaves
room for abuse, leading to less efficient results. Based on the current rule, the
merger authority could hear the competitor, but it should almost never listen,
unless certain conditions of its prior information are fulfilled.
From a policy perspective, it will be desirable to strengthen the deterrent effect
of opening Phase 2 proceedings per se (rather than its individual instruments)
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and to improve the scanning process in Phase 1. Phase 2 decisions tie up resources
over several months and should be concentrated on the most controversial merg-
ers only, while ideally, the deterrent effects of Phase 1 instruments should suffice
to influence future notifications. Prohibitions in Phase 2 can be avoided by en-
couraging to the merging firms already in Phase 1 to withdraw their notification.
Thus, the authority should devote its efforts to improve its capability in Phase
1 scanning so as, among other goals, to conclude those merger cases already in
Phase 1 which are highly likely to be prohibited in Phase 2 and to reduce the
number of Phase 2 cases to a necessary minimum. Improved Phase 1 scanning
further implies that the procurement of information on a specific merger must be-




In this appendix, we show the results for an alternative definition of our industry
control variables, where we use the U.S. census bureau table of conversion and
apply an m to 1 matching procedure to link the SIC and NACE industries for our
industry control variables. In our main sample we linked only one NACE industry
with one SIC industry. Here we place several SIC industries (and their firms), for
which we have accountancy and stock market data, multiple times in the same
NACE market as defined by the Commission when dealing with mergers. This
matching procedure is more comprehensive since any potential overlap between
industries is now taken care of, but it comes at the cost of double counting parts
of some industries.
As can be seen from Table A.1 below, results are qualitatively the same. In par-
ticular, only Phase 1 Remedies show robust deterrence effects. Control variables
and model adequateness are also qualitatively the same.
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Table A.1: Robustness Check – Main Analysis – Industries’ Double Counting
OLS Fixed System OLS Fixed System
Effects GMM Effects GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Merger Proposalst−1 0.428∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗
(0.040) (0.05548) (0.163) (0.039) (0.054) (0.211)
Merger Proposalst−2 0.304∗∗∗ 0.03327 0.1000 0.304∗∗∗ 0.030 0.087
(0.043) (0.05106) (0.0711) (0.043) (0.050) (0.115)
Actionst−1 −0.072 −0.04004 −0.302
(0.047) (0.0463) (0.213)
P1 Remediest−1 −0.119∗∗ −0.126∗∗ −0.904∗
(0.056) (0.050) (0.536)
P1 Withdrawalst−1 0.019 0.007 −0.609
(0.087) (0.078) (0.496)
P2 Remediest−1 0.008 0.082 0.562
(0.102) (0.088) (0.777)
P2 Preventionst−1 −0.084 −0.030 −0.281
(0.161) (0.124) (0.883)
HHIt−1 −1.125∗∗∗ 0.827 −2.243 −1.132∗∗∗ 0.823 −2.453
(0.377) (0.586) (3.735) (0.373) (0.582) (3.804)
Betat−1 (×100) −0.400 −0.00492 −0.00491 −0.331 −0.432 0.49
(1.00) (10.0129) (0.01.08) (0.949) (1.280) (1.350)
Salesgrowtht−1 0.028 −0.0150 0.0534 0.0281 −0.0147 0.016
(0.082) (0.108) (0.114) (0.0828) (0.108) (0.128)
Tobinsqt−1 (×100) −0.004 −0.0654∗∗ −0.0667 0.001 −0.060∗∗ −0.027
(0.034) (0.0313) (0.0573) (0.033) (0.029) (0.061)
Sharereturnt−1 0.272∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗
(0.083) (0.073) (0.0887) (0.082) (0.0698) (0.115)
Constant 0.557∗∗∗ 1.446∗∗∗ 0.673∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 1.466∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗
(0.114) (0.168) (0.380) (0.115) (0.166) (0.364)
Observations 666 666 666 666 666 666
R2 0.608 0.460 0.609 0.463
# of instruments 62 62
Sargan test 0.815 0.901
Arellano-Bond test 0.880 0.869
Notes: In columns (1) and (2), we report the estimate from a OLS regression. In columns (3) and
(4), we report the results from a panel fixed-effects regression. In columns (5) and (6), we report
the results from the system GMM estimation to account for the dynamic nature of our model. The
dependent variable is the log of merger proposals. All merger policy action variables are expressed
in logs. In all regressions, we include year fixed-effects. In columns (1) to (4), heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported in parentheses. In columns (5)
and (6), heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels is represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively. For the fixed-effects
estimates in columns (3) and (4) we report the R2 within. We report the p-values for the Sargan






Table B.1: Logit by Years









y −0.197 ∗ −0.101 0.0821 −0.127 0.102
(0.103) (0.145) (0.255) (0.112) (0.255)
y2 0.0114 ∗∗∗ 0.00722 −0.000552 0.00816 −0.000533
(0.00402) (0.00636) (0.0160) (0.00638) (0.0165)
Experience Acqit 0.0158 ∗ 0.0160 ∗ 0.0193 ∗∗ 0.0183 ∗∗ 0.0200 ∗∗
(0.00900) (0.00888) (0.00962) (0.00891) (0.00919)
Experience Tarit 0.0566 0.0593 0.0534 0.0519 0.0485
(0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0364) (0.0355) (0.0392)
PastYIndustryPrevit −0.664 ∗ −0.634 ∗ −0.587 −0.587 −0.522
(0.379) (0.377) (0.383) (0.377) (0.354)
1yHHIit −0.778 −0.723 0.325 −1.206
(2.567) (2.569) (2.425) (0.863)
1yBetait 0.0191 0.0179 0.0112 0.0165
(0.0310) (0.0319) (0.0297) (0.0265)
1ySalesgrowthit −0.716 −0.755 −0.840 −0.168
(0.771) (0.760) (0.765) (0.721)
1yMarkettoBookit −0.0139 ∗∗∗ −0.0144 ∗∗∗ −0.00871 −0.0141 ∗∗
(0.00529) (0.00516) (0.00536) (0.00560)
1ySharereturnit 0.331 ∗ 0.334 ∗ 0.387 ∗∗ 0.221 ∗
(0.173) (0.180) (0.185) (0.132)
1yLogTobinsqit 0.0593 0.0536 −0.0583 0.182
(0.230) (0.228) (0.259) (0.174)
2yHHIit −0.812 −1.004 −1.601
(2.699) (2.692) (2.635)
2yBetait 0.00888 0.00925 0.0221
(0.0218) (0.0232) (0.0235)
2ySalesgrowthit −0.290 −0.394 −0.156
(0.777) (0.737) (0.700)
2yMarkettoBookit −0.00441 −0.00539 −0.00435
(0.00366) (0.00406) (0.00346)
2ySharereturnit 0.0351 0.0678 0.00832
(0.107) (0.111) (0.109)
















Notifications/yi,t−1 0.0121 ∗∗∗ 0.00968∗∗∗ 0.0133 ∗∗∗
(0.00376) (0.00202) (0.00339)
Ph1 Remedies/yi,t−1 −0.0111 −0.0474 ∗ −0.0197
(0.0364) (0.0242) (0.0305)
Ph2 Remedies/yi,t−1 −0.247 ∗∗ −0.111 ∗∗ −0.242 ∗∗
(0.107) (0.0529) (0.104)
Ph1 Withdrawals/yi,t−1 −0.0185 −0.0133 −0.000442
(0.0494) (0.0442) (0.0406)
Preventions/yi,t−1 −0.0730 −0.0533 −0.0733
(0.0619) (0.0632) (0.0580)




Ph1 Remedies/yi,t−2 0.0559 0.0393
(0.0563) (0.0551)
Ph2 Remedies/yi,t−2 0.0122 0.00261
(0.0744) (0.0732)
Ph1 Withdrawals/yi,t−2 0.185 ∗ 0.168 ∗∗
(0.0989) (0.0827)




Constant −2.186 ∗∗ −2.310 ∗∗ −4.014 ∗∗∗ −2.795 ∗∗∗ −4.472 ∗∗∗
(0.942) (0.952) (1.267) (0.925) (1.167)
Observations 1773 1773 1773 1773 1773
Notes: Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses: (VCE)robust, y cluster; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.2: Logit by Quarters









q −0.0487 ∗ −0.0504 ∗ −0.0430 ∗ −0.0414 ∗ −0.0367
(0.0256) (0.0271) (0.0240) (0.0232) (0.0266)
q2 0.000669∗∗∗ 0.000686∗∗ 0.000650∗∗∗ 0.000676∗∗∗ 0.000583∗∗
(0.000236) (0.000287) (0.000234) (0.000195) (0.000244)
Experience Acqit 0.0167 ∗ 0.0166 ∗ 0.0143 0.0156 ∗ 0.0152 ∗
(0.00884) (0.00871) (0.00900) (0.00839) (0.00841)
Experience Tarit 0.0573 0.0572 0.0626 0.0570 0.0577
(0.0362) (0.0363) (0.0395) (0.0381) (0.0413)
PastYIndustryPrevit −0.669 ∗ −0.678 ∗ −0.678 ∗ −0.675 ∗ −0.616 ∗
(0.381) (0.382) (0.384) (0.379) (0.359)
1yHHIit −0.839 −0.902 −1.112 −1.400
(2.596) (2.614) (2.526) (0.882)
1yBetait 0.0193 0.0185 0.0187 0.0233
(0.0313) (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0274)
1ySalesgrowthit −0.727 −0.747 −0.761 −0.392
(0.780) (0.789) (0.844) (0.725)
1yMarkettoBookit −0.0136 ∗∗ −0.0130 ∗∗ −0.0117 ∗∗ −0.0160 ∗∗∗
(0.00528) (0.00562) (0.00544) (0.00617)
1ySharereturnit 0.331 ∗ 0.331 ∗ 0.356 ∗ 0.245 ∗
(0.180) (0.181) (0.185) (0.130)
1yLogTobinsqit 0.0523 0.0370 −0.0154 0.176
(0.235) (0.248) (0.245) (0.190)
2yHHIit −0.776 −0.652 −0.404
(2.714) (2.743) (2.672)
2yBetait 0.00754 0.00776 0.00724
(0.0219) (0.0215) (0.0229)
2ySalesgrowthit −0.266 −0.293 −0.331
(0.771) (0.823) (0.836)
2yMarkettoBookit −0.00436 −0.00430 −0.00447
(0.00377) (0.00374) (0.00367)
2ySharereturnit 0.0404 0.0417 0.0241
(0.106) (0.107) (0.0925)
















Notifications/qi,t−1 0.00616 0.00457 0.00786
(0.00644) (0.00507) (0.00702)
Ph1 Remedies/qi,t−1 −0.0316 −0.0239 −0.0349
(0.0655) (0.0486) (0.0595)
Ph2 Remedies/qi,t−1 0.0355 −0.0173 0.0473
(0.0896) (0.0768) (0.0872)
Ph1 Withdrawals/qi,t−1 0.113 ∗∗ 0.109 ∗∗ 0.130 ∗
(0.0506) (0.0532) (0.0667)
Preventions/qi,t−1 0.0540 −0.0110 0.0418
(0.0547) (0.0673) (0.0542)




Ph1 Remedies/qi,t−2 0.000410 −0.0102
(0.0302) (0.0332)
Ph2 Remedies/qi,t−2 −0.0321 −0.0205
(0.0773) (0.0760)
Ph1 Withdrawals/qi,t−2 −0.0674 −0.0619
(0.0573) (0.0665)




Constant −2.105 ∗∗ −2.113 ∗∗ −2.562 ∗∗ −2.551 ∗∗ −3.083 ∗∗∗
(0.989) (0.978) (1.021) (1.025) (0.948)




C.1 Pure-Strategy Equilibria of the Signaling
Game
We formally derive all pure-strategy equilibria of our signaling game. We start
with the babbling equilbrium which is known to exist in a game of the present
form.
Lemma 1. The game has (two) equilibria in which either TA or TB is empty,
i.e., S’s equilibrium strategy is uninformative. In these equilibria, R ignores S’s
message and implements the default decision. Formally, the set of these equilibria
is characterised by
m∗(t1) = m∗(t2) = m∗(t3) = m∗(t4) = mx, mx ∈ M,
d∗(mA) = d∗(mB) = ddefault,
µ(ti|mx) = p(ti), ti ∈ T,
µ(ti|my) such that
µ(t2|my) + µ(t3|my) ≥ µ(t1|my) + µ(t4|my) if p(t2) + p(t3) ≥ p(t1) + p(t4),
µ(t2|my) + µ(t3|my) < µ(t1|my) + µ(t4|my) if p(t2) + p(t3) < p(t1) + p(t4).
These equilibria always exist.
Note: The uninformative equilibria of Lemma 1 require that R always imple-
ments the default decision after observing the off-equilibrium message. Otherwise
S has an incentive to deviate in the cases where the default does not coincide
with S’s preferred decision. Therefore, the prior beliefs are a supporting belief
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system off the equilibrium path (as are any beliefs that always implement the
default decision).
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, as S always sends the same message mx (for every
type), R’s beliefs on the equilibrium path are the prior beliefs. This implies that
the default decision is implemented. The default decision is based on expected
welfare only. Thus, it might be dP or dC . Depending on the true type, S’s
preferred choice might coincide with the default or not. If not, then S would have
an incentive to deviate to the off-equilibrium message my if that message ever
changes R’s (default) decision in the cases where S wants to deviate. Therefore,
R’s off-equilibrium beliefs must be such that R implements the default whenever
the off-equilibrium message my is observed. More precisely:
1. Suppose the type realisation is ti ∈ {t1, t2}. Then S prefers dC . If ddefault =
dC , there is no incentive to deviate. If, however, ddefault = dP , then S has
an incentive to deviate to the off-equilibrium message my if that leads to
dC . Therefore, if p(t2) + p(t3) < p(t1) + p(t4) (when ddefault = dP ), then the




i.e., lead to the implementation of ddefault = dP . By (W1, W2, W3, W4) =
(−1, 1, 1, −1), this is equivalent to
µ(t2|my) + µ(t3|my) < µ(t1|my) + µ(t4|my).
It can be seen that this corresponds to the relation of priors that implements
ddefault = dP .
2. Suppose the type realisation is ti ∈ {t3, t4}. Then S prefers dP . If ddefault =
dP , there is no incentive to deviate. If, however, ddefault = dC , then S has
an incentive to deviate to the off-equilibrium message my if that leads to
dP . Therefore, if p(t2) + p(t3) ≥ p(t1) + p(t4) (when ddefault = dC), then the





C.1 Pure-Strategy Equilibria of the Signaling Game
i.e., lead to the implementation of ddefault = dC . By (W1, W2, W3, W4) =
(−1, 1, 1, −1), this is equivalent to
µ(t2|my) + µ(t3|my) ≥ µ(t1|my) + µ(t4|my).
It can be seen that this corresponds to the relation of priors that implements
ddefault = dC .
Lemma 2. The game has equilibria in which either TA or TB is a singleton
set, i.e., S’s equilibrium strategy reveals one of the four merger types. In these
equilibria, R ignores S’s message and implements the default decision. Formally,
the set of these equilibria is characterised by (where ti, tj, tk, tl ∈ T are different
types and mx, my ∈ M are different messages)
m∗(ti) = m∗(tj) = m∗(tk) = mx, m∗(tl) = my,
d∗(mA) = d∗(mB) = ddefault = dP if

ts∈Tx
p(ts)Ws < 0, Wl < 0,
d∗(mA) = d∗(mB) = ddefault = dC if

ts∈Tx




, µ(ts|my) = 0, ts ∈ Tx = {ti, tj, tk},
µ(tl|my) = 1, µ(tl|mx) = 0.
(C.1)
If either (ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws < 0, Wl > 0) or (ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws ≤ 0, Wl > 0), there is
no such equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider S’s candidate strategy which can be represented
by Tx = {ti, tj, tk} and Ty = {tl} where x ̸= y. Both messages are therefore
played on the equilibrium path. As message my is only sent for type tl, we have
µ(tl|my) = 1, and the best response is
d∗(my) =
dP if Wl < 0,dC if Wl > 0. (C.2)
The remaining message mx is sent for all other types, which gives the updated
beliefs stated in (C.1). R’s best response is found as follows. Decision dP implies
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ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws < 0,
dC if

ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws ≥ 0.
(C.3)
Combining (C.2) and (C.3), we have to distinguish four constellations of prior
probabilities:
1. ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws < 0 and Wl < 0:
(The above conditions imply ti∈T p(ti)Wi < 0, which gives ddefault = dP .)
Here, d∗(my) = d∗(mx) = dP = ddefault. We have an equilibrium because R
ignores S’s message and S, therefore, cannot profitably deviate.
2. ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws < 0 and Wl > 0:
Here, d∗(my) = dC and d∗(mx) = dP . S sends mx for three types and has a
payoff of 0 in these cases. There is no equilibrium here, because for one of
those three types, S’s payoff can be improved from 0 to 1 by reporting my
instead, which leads to decision dC .
3. ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws ≥ 0 and Wl < 0:
Here, d∗(my) = dP and d∗(mx) = dC . S sends mx for three types and
must have a negative payoff for at least one of those types. There is no
equilibrium here, because S can avoid a negative payoff by reporting my
instead, which leads to decision dP with a payoff of 0.
4. ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws ≥ 0 and Wl > 0:
(The above conditions imply ti∈T p(ti)Wi ≥ 0, which gives ddefault = dC .)
Here, d∗(my) = d∗(mx) = dC = ddefault. We have an equilibrium because R
ignores S’s message and S, therefore, cannot profitably deviate.
Lemma 3. The game has equilibria in which TA and TB each have two ele-
ments, i.e., in each of these equilibria, pairs of types are associated with the
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same message. Formally, the set of these equilibria is characterised by (where
ti, tj, tk, tl ∈ T are different types and mx, my ∈ M are different messages)
m∗(ti) = m∗(tj) = mx, m∗(tk) = m∗(tl) = my,
















d∗(mx) = dP , d∗(my) = dC








, µ(tu|mx) = 0, tu ∈ Ty = {tk, tl}.
(C.4)





p(tu)Wu ≥ 0, Tx ̸= {t3, t4}
 .
Proof of Lemma 3. Given Tx = {ti, tj} and Ty = {tk, tl}, both feasible mes-
sages mj ∈ M are played on the equilibrium path, each message by exactly two
types. The corresponding updated beliefs conditional on message mx, resp. my,
therefore have the form stated in (C.4). Consider S’s decision conditional on

























ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws < 0,
dC if

ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws ≥ 0.
(C.5)




tu∈Ty p(tu)Wu < 0,
dC if

tu∈Ty p(tu)Wu ≥ 0.
(C.6)
Combining (C.5) and (C.6), we have to distinguish four constellations of prior
probabilities:
1. ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws < 0 and tu∈Ty p(tu)Wu < 0:
(This constellation implies ti∈T p(ti)Wi < 0 and, therefore, ddefault = dP .)
Here, d∗(my) = d∗(mx) = dP = ddefault. We have an equilibrium because R
ignores S’s message and S, therefore, cannot profitably deviate.
2. ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws ≥ 0 and tu∈Ty p(tu)Wu ≥ 0:
(This constellation implies ti∈T p(ti)Wi ≥ 0 and, therefore, ddefault = dC .)
Here, d∗(my) = d∗(mx) = dC = ddefault. We have an equilibrium because R
ignores S’s message and S, therefore, cannot profitably deviate.
3. ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws < 0 and tu∈Ty p(tu)Wu ≥ 0:
Here, d∗(mx) = dP and d∗(my) = dC . Therefore, S is able to choose R’s
decision in its favor by sending the appropriate message. This implies that
there is no equilibrium here unless R’s decisions are equal to S’s preferred
decisions for every type. This is equivalent to requiring that Tx = {t3, t4}
(i.e., blocking of types 3 and 4) and Ty = {t1, t2} (i.e., clearing of types 1 and
2), where, as before, mx and my are arbitrary but different feasible messages.
Given that Tx = {t3, t4} and Ty = {t1, t2}, the condition (

ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws <
0 and tu∈Ty p(tu)Wu ≥ 0) simplifies to
p(t3)W3 + p(t4)W4 < 0 and p(t1)W1 + p(t2)W2 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ p(t3) < p(t4) and p(t1) ≤ p(t2).
4. ts∈Tx p(ts)Ws ≥ 0 and tu∈Ty p(tu)Wu < 0:
As mx and my are arbitrary (but different and feasible) messages, the anal-
ysis of this case is already covered in the analysis of case 3, above.
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Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 3, the selfish equilibrium exists whenever
(4.3) holds. By Lemmas 1–3 and C.2, all pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria
except the selfish equilibrium implement the default decision. Therefore, it suf-
fices to show that the selfish equilibrium is payoff-superior for both players to the
corresponding default decision.
First, suppose dP is the default decision. Then taking the default implies
UR = 0, whereas the selfish equilibrium implements dP if the merger type is
either type 3 or type 4, with UR = 0. If, however, the merger is of type 1, we get
UR = −1 and for type 2 we get UR = 1 where, by (4.3), the latter is more likely.
In expectation the selfish equilibrium implements E[UR] = −p(t1) + p(t2) ≥ 0,
which is better than the default UR = 0.
Second, suppose dC is the default decision. Taking the default implies E[UR] =
−p(t1)+p(t2)+p(t3)−p(t4) ≥ 0. The equilibrium implements dP for types 3 and
4, and it implements dC for types 1 (with UR = −1) and 2 (with UR = 1) where,
again, welfare is conditionally more likely to be positive. In expectation, the
equilibrium implements E[UR] = −p(t1) + p(t2) > −p(t1) + p(t2) + p(t3) − p(t4),
because p(t3) < p(t4) by (4.3).
Combining these results, we conclude that the selfish equilibrium implements
higher expected welfare than the default, regardless of what the default decision
is.
The selfish equilibrium implements S’s preferred decision for every actual merger
type. Therefore, S’s profit is maximised for every merger type. This implies that
in expectation profit is larger than under the default decision which is made in
order to maximise welfare, regardless of S’s profit.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds by looking at all possible combi-
nations of information and decisions. In each case we first analyze the selfish
equilibrium (where the decision is based on prior as well as S’s revealed infor-
mation) and then compare with the default decision (which is based on prior
information only).
We need to distinguish four cases: There are two possible sets of truthful
information revealed by S in the selfish equilibria, i.e., the profit-increasing types
{t1, t2} and the profit-reducing types {t3, t4}. For each, the default decision can
be either dP or dC . Denote the true merger type with ti.
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1. Suppose S reveals ti ∈ {t1, t2} and the default is ddefault = dC . The selfish
equilibrium implements dC = ddefault. As the true type has been revealed to be
either 1 or 2, the decision dC is ex post correct if the type is 2, and wrong if it is
type 1. The probability of the former is p(t2)/(p(t1)+p(t2)), which is at least 1/2
(and strictly larger if p(t2) > p(t1)), by (4.3). As the default decision is assumed
to be ddefault = dC , we must have p(t2) + p(t3) ≥ p(t1) + p(t4), by (4.1). Based on
that (prior) information, ddefault is correct if the merger is type 2 or 3, which has
a probability of p(t2) + p(t3)/(p(t1) + p(t2) + p(t3) + p(t4) = p(t2) + p(t3) ≥ 1/2.
By the above, the decision in the selfish equilibrium is more accurate if
p(t2)
p(t1) + p(t2)
≥ p(t2) + p(t3).
Multiply by (p(t1) + p(t2))/p(t2) and simplify to get




As p(t1) + p(t2) + p(t3) + p(t4) = 1, (C.7) holds iff the last term on the right-hand
side is not larger than p(t4),
p(t1)p(t3)
p(t2)
≤ p(t4) ⇐⇒ p(t1)p(t3) ≤ p(t2)p(t4).
The latter is true by (4.3) (multiply the smaller and larger sides in the two
conditions of (4.3), respectively).
2. Suppose S reveals ti ∈ {t3, t4} and the default is ddefault = dP . The selfish
equilibrium implements dP = ddefault. As the true type has been revealed to
be either 3 or 4, the decision dP is ex post correct if the type is 4, and wrong
if it is type 3. The probability of the former is p(t4)/(p(t3) + p(t4)), which is
larger than 1/2, by (4.3). As the default decision is assumed to be ddefault = dP ,
we must have p(t2) + p(t3) < p(t1) + p(t4), by (4.1). Based on that (prior)
information, ddefault is correct if the merger is type 1 or 4, which has a probability
of p(t1) + p(t4)/(p(t1) + p(t2) + p(t3) + p(t4) = p(t1) + p(t4) > 1/2. By the above,
the decision in the selfish equilibrium is more accurate if
p(t4)
p(t3) + p(t4)
≥ p(t1) + p(t4).
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Multiply by (p(t3) + p(t4))/p(t4) and simplify to get
1 ≥ p(t1) +
p(t1)p(t3)
p(t4)
+ p(t3) + p(t4). (C.8)
As p(t1)+p(t2)+p(t3)+p(t4) = 1, (C.8) holds iff the second term on the right-hand
side is not larger than p(t2),
p(t1)p(t3)
p(t4)
≤ p(t2) ⇐⇒ p(t1)p(t3) ≤ p(t2)p(t4).
The latter is true by (4.3) (multiply the smaller and larger sides in the two
conditions of (4.3), respectively).
3. Suppose S reveals ti ∈ {t1, t2} and the default is ddefault = dP . The selfish
equilibrium implements dC ̸= ddefault. The accuracy of the equilibrium decision is
p(t2)/(p(t1) + p(t2)) ≥ 1/2, whereas, based on the available information, ddefault
is correct only with probability p(t1)/(p(t1) + p(t2)) ≤ 1/2. Therefore, based on
the information revealed in the selfish equilibrium, the default decision (based on
priors only) is wrong.
4. Suppose S reveals ti ∈ {t3, t4} and the default is ddefault = dC . The selfish
equilibrium implements dP ̸= ddefault. The accuracy of the equilibrium decision is
p(t4)/(p(t3) + p(t4)) > 1/2, whereas, based on the available information, ddefault
is correct only with probability p(t3)/(p(t3) + p(t4)) < 1/2. Therefore, based on
the information revealed in the selfish equilibrium, the default decision (based on
priors only) is wrong.
C.2 Mixed-Strategy Equilibria of the Signaling
Game
In this section, we formally identify all perfect Bayesian equilibria in mixed strate-
gies of the signaling game between the competitor (S) and the authority (R). In




As in the previous section, we denote two arbitrary but different messages with
mx and my.
As we consider mixed strategies now, we introduce additional notation. We
denote S’s strategies by
p̃i = Pr{mx|ti} ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Therefore, p̃1 is the probability that S sends the message mx if the merger type
is t1. A complete strategy of S is therefore given by the vector
p̃S := (p̃1, p̃2, p̃3, p̃4).
Similarly, denote
p̃x = Pr{dC |mx} ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ {A, B}.
Therefore, p̃x is the probability that R clears the merger (dC) after observing
message mx. A complete strategy of R is given by the vector
p̃R := (p̃A, p̃B).
Moreover, we introduce an assumption that rules out special non-generic (non-
general) configurations of the prior probabilities. In particular, this implies a
unique default decision, ddefault.
Assumption.
p2 + p3 ̸= p1 + p4, p1 ̸= p2, p3 ̸= p4. (C.9)
There are exactly two strategies of S where R’s beliefs do not entirely follow
from Bayes’ rule. These are p̃S = (1, 1, 1, 1), and p̃S = (0, 0, 0, 0). Under these
pure babbling strategies, S sends only one of the two messages. We now argue
that in these cases R will never respond with a mixed strategy: As S’s strategy
does not reveal any information, R’s best response is to decide based on priors.
By (C.9), the default decision is unique, implying a pure strategy.
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Therefore, it remains to analyse candidate strategies of S in which both mes-
sages are sent with strictly positive probabilities, implying that all of R’s updated








∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
(C.10)
Note that the denominators in (C.10) are strictly positive as we rule out babbling
strategies of S, and priors are assumed to be strictly positive.
Based on these updated beliefs, we now consider R’s optimal decision. First,












Decision dC is optimal whenever the above is nonnegative, i.e.,
4
i=1
(p̃ipiWi) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 ≥ p̃1p1 + p̃4p4. (C.11)
Second, consider message my. Decision dP implies UR = 0, while decision dC











Decision dC is optimal whenever the above is nonnegative, i.e.,
4
i=1
((1 − p̃i)piWi) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 + p1 + p4 ≤ p̃1p1 + p̃4p4 + p2 + p3.
(C.12)




Having characterised the conditions for R’s best response, (C.11) and (C.12),
we now partition R’s candidate strategies as follows
(A) R plays a pure strategy with message-dependent decisions,
(i.e., p̃x, p̃y ∈ {0, 1}, p̃x ̸= p̃y).
(B) R plays a pure strategy with message-independent decision,
(i.e., p̃x, p̃y ∈ {0, 1}, p̃x = p̃y).
(C) R plays mixed strategies following both messages,
(i.e., p̃x, p̃y ∈ (0, 1)).
(D) R plays a mixed strategy following one message, and a pure strategy fol-
lowing the other message,
(i.e., p̃x ∈ (0, 1), p̃y ∈ {0, 1}).
We now analyze (A) to (D) in detail.
(A) In any candidate equilibrium of this kind, R’s optimal decision is dC after
message mx and dP after message my. The resulting S’s payoff from sending
message mx, depending on merger type, is Π1 = Π2 = 1 and Π3 = Π4 = −1.
The other message, my, implements dP with payoffs equal to zero. Therefore,
S’s best response is unique and pure: p̃S = (1, 1, 0, 0). Therefore, there is no
mixed-strategy equilibrium here.
(B) In any candidate equilibrium of this kind, R’s optimal decision is either
dC after any message, or always dP . Recalling (C.11) and (C.12), we distinguish
two cases, by the decision that is implemented. In case a), dC is implemented
after any message, and in case b), dP is implemented after any message.
a)
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 ≥ p̃1p1 + p̃4p4, and
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 + p1 + p4 ≤ p̃1p1 + p̃4p4 + p2 + p3.
(C.13)
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Whenever S’s strategy is such that these conditions hold, it is optimal for
to R to implement dC regardless of the message. This coincides with the
default decision, as the above conditions imply p2 + p3 > p1 + p4 (recall
that by (C.9), the two conditions of (C.13) cannot simultaneously hold
with equality). As R’s decision is message-independent, S’s best response
is any pure or mixed strategy. We have equilibria whenever these strategies
satisfy (C.13). Therefore, we have a continuum of equilibria, where S plays
a mixed strategy, while R implements the default decision dC .
b)
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 ≤ p̃1p1 + p̃4p4, and
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 + p1 + p4 ≥ p̃1p1 + p̃4p4 + p2 + p3.
(C.14)
The argument here is similar to case a), except that here dP is implemented
and the default decision is dP as well, as (C.14) implies p2 + p3 < p1 +
p4. Therefore, we have a continuum of equilibria, where S plays a mixed
strategy, while R implements the default decision dP .
(C) Here, R must be indifferent between both decisions for each message. By
(C.11) and (C.12), this implies
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 = p̃1p1 + p̃4p4, and
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 + p1 + p4 = p̃1p1 + p̃4p4 + p2 + p3.
This implies p2 + p3 = p1 + p4, which violates (C.9). Therefore, there is no
equilibrium in which R plays a mixed strategy after both messages.
(D) We distinguish two cases. In case a), R implements dC after mx and plays
a mixed strategy after my. In case b), R implements dP after mx and plays a
mixed strategy after my.
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a) Recalling (C.11) and (C.12), we require indifference after message my (i.e.,
equality in (C.12)) which, by (C.9), implies a strict inequality in (C.11):
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 > p̃1p1 + p̃4p4, and
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 + p1 + p4 = p̃1p1 + p̃4p4 + p2 + p3.
(C.15)
As dC is implemented after mx, S’s payoff from sending mx is, depending
on the merger type, Π1 = Π2 = 1 and Π3 = Π4 = −1. In contrast, sending
message my results in mixed play by R, which gives S an expected payoff
for merger type i of
p̃yΠi + (1 − p̃y) · 0 =

p̃y if i ∈ {1, 2},
−p̃y if i ∈ {3, 4}.
By p̃y ∈ (0, 1), S’s unique best response is to send message mx for types
1 and 2, and send message my for types 3 and 4. Therefore, S’s unique
best response is the pure strategy p̃S = (1, 1, 0, 0). This, however, implies
that the second line of (C.15) simplifies to p4 = p3, which violates (C.9).
Therefore, there is no equilibrium here.
b) Recalling (C.11) and (C.12), we require indifference after message my (i.e.,
equality in (C.12)) which, by (C.9), implies a strict inequality in (C.11):
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 < p̃1p1 + p̃4p4, and
p̃2p2 + p̃3p3 + p1 + p4 = p̃1p1 + p̃4p4 + p2 + p3.
(C.16)
As dP is implemented after mx, S’s payoff from sending mx is zero. In
contrast, sending message my results in mixed play by R, which gives S an
expected payoff for merger type i of
p̃yΠi + (1 − p̃y) · 0 =

p̃y if i ∈ {1, 2},
−p̃y if i ∈ {3, 4}.
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By p̃y ∈ (0, 1), S’s unique best response is to send message my for types
1 and 2, and send message mx for types 3 and 4. Therefore, S’s unique
best response is the pure strategy p̃S = (0, 0, 1, 1). This, however, implies
that the second line of (C.15) simplifies to p1 = p2, which violates (C.9).
Therefore, there is no equilibrium here.
C.3 Data
Table C.1: Cases with Competitor Participation in Phase 2 EU
Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.42 1990 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.43 1990 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.126 1991 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.12 1991 1
Art. 8(3) M.53 1991 0
Art. 8(2) M.68 1991 0
Art. 8(2) M.222 1992 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.214 1992 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.190 1992 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.291 1992 0
Art. 8(2) M.358 1993 0
Art. 8(2) M.315 1993 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.308 1993 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.468 1994 0
Art. 8(3) M.469 1994 0
Art. 8(2) M.269 1994 0
Art. 8(2) M.477 1994 1
Art. 8(2) M.484 1994 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.430 1994 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.582 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.623 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.553 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.580 1995 0




Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.603 1995 0
Art. 8(3) M.619 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.856 1996 0
Art. 8(3), Art. 8(4) M.784 1996 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.754 1996 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.737 1996 0
Art. 8(3) M.774 1996 0
Art. 8(2) M.794 1996 1
Art. 8(2) M.970 1997 0
Art. 8(3), Art. 8(4) M.890 1997 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1069 1997 1
Art. 8(2) M.1016 1997 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.950 1997 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.938 1997 1
Art. 8(3) M.993 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.986 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.942 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.833 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.877 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.913 1997 0
Art. 8(3) M.1027 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1313 1998 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1221 1998 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1225 1998 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1157 1998 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1673 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1636 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1663 1999 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1601 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1693 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1630 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1383 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1641 1999 0
Art. 8(3) M.1524 1999 1




Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1628 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1671 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1578 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1439 1999 1
Art. 8(3) M.1672 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1915 2000 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1845 2000 0
Art. 8(3) M.1741 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1813 2000 1
Art. 8(2) M.1940 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1853 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2060 2000 1
Art. 8(2) M.2499 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2033 2000 1
Art. 8(2) M.1879 2000 1
Art. 8(2) M.2498 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1806 2000 1
Art. 8(3) M.2097 2000 0
Art. 8(2) M.1882 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2139 2000 1
Art. 8(4) M.2416 2001 0
Art. 8(2) M.2333 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2533 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2434 2001 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2530 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2547 2001 1
Art. 8(2) M.2621 2001 0
Art. 8(2) M.2495 2001 0
Art. 8(3) M.2220 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2568 2001 1
Art. 8(4) M.2283 2001 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2420 2001 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2389 2001 1
Art. 8(3) M.2187 2001 1




Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) M.2201 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2947 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2903 2002 0
Art. 8(2) M.2706 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2876 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2698 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2650 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2861 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2822 2002 1
Art. 8(2) M.3056 2003 0
Art. 8(2) M.3216 2003 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2978 2003 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3083 2003 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2972 2003 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3099 2003 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3431 2004 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3436 2004 1
Art. 8(3) M.3440 2004 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3916 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3868 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3796 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3653 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3687 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3696 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4187 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4000 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4404 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4180 2006 1
Art. 8(3) M.4439 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4381 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4525 2007 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4504 2007 1
Art. 8(2) M.3333 2007 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4726 2007 1




Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5153 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4980 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4919 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5046 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5335 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5440 2009 1
Art. 8(3) M.5830 2010 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5658 2010 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5675 2010 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6266 2011 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6203 2011 1
Art. 8(3) M.6166 2011 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6286 2011 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6497 2012 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6576 2012 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6471 2012 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6690 2012 1
Art. 8(3) M.6663 2012 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6410 2012 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6458 2012 1
Art. 8(3) M.6570 2012 0
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Table C.2: Competitor Participation as a Share of Phase 2 Cases EU (Figure 4.1)
Year Sum Sum Sum Participation/
Notification Participation Phase 2 Sum Phase 2
1990 0 2 0
1991 2 4 0.5
1992 0 4 0
1993 0 3 0
1994 1 6 0.167
1995 0 7 0
1996 1 6 0.167
1997 5 13 0.385
1998 4 4 1
1999 12 15 0.8
2000 12 15 0.8
2001 10 16 0.625
2002 7 8 0.875
2003 2 6 0.333
2004 3 3 1
2005 6 6 1
2006 6 6 1
2007 5 5 1
2008 5 5 1
2009 1 1 1
2010 3 3 1
2011 4 4 1
2012 5 8 0.625
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Table C.3: Competitor Objections as a Share of Phase 2 Cases with Competitor
Involvement EU (Figure 4.2)
Year Sum Sum Sum Objections/
Notification Participation Objections Sum Participation
1997 5 1 0.2
1998 4 1 0.25
1999 12 3 0.25
2000 12 2 0.167
2001 10 1 0.1
2002 7 4 0.571
2003 2 1 0.5
2004 3 3 1
2005 6 6 1
2006 6 5 0.833
2007 5 5 1
2008 5 5 1
2009 1 1 1
2010 3 3 1
2011 4 3 0.75
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